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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The Governance of Indonesian Overseas Employment in the 
Context of Decentralization 
Palmira Permata Bachtiar 
 
 
This study looks at emigration governance in the context of decentralized Indonesia. It 
examines various local initiatives that have evolved following the onset of decentralization in 
Indonesia a decade ago. These initiatives materialize in the form of perda (local regulations). In 
this study, first, a literature review is performed particularly to address the issue of perda related 
to overseas employment. Prior to the mapping analysis, a typology of four possible types of 
perda is constructed. Out of the 127 collected perda, 81% fall in type-1 perda (perda on general 
employment, which are extractive); 14.2% fall in type-2 perda (perda on general kabupaten 
(district) revenues, which are extractive); 2.4% fall in type-3 perda (perda on placement 
procedure, which are nonextractive); and 2.4% fall in type-4 perda (perda on migrant workers’ 
protection, which are nonextractive). The study finds that migrant-source kabupaten issue both 
higher numbers and varieties of perda related to overseas employment with type-1 and type-2 
perda being the majority, while only three kabupaten (3.7% of 82 kabupaten) issue type-4 perda. 
Interestingly, our typology is not necessarily mutually exclusive, as kabupaten that pass 
protection perda do pass extractive perda as well. 
 
Second, fieldwork is conducted in four migrant-source kabupaten which have received 
technical assistance from donor agencies to formulate protection perda. In order to understand 
why Kabupaten Blitar and Kabupaten Lombok Barat were able to pass protection perda, while 
Kabupaten Ponorogo and Kabupaten Lombok Tengah could not, the study looks at the 
internal factors: stakeholders and the relationships between them; and the external factors 
which are beyond the control of the stakeholders. Our field study shows that the policy 
process in each kabupaten is unique and cannot be explained in a standard model. The duration 
of the policy process, substance of the perda, position of the advocating nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), intervention of private recruitment agencies (PPTKIS), and the timing 
of election are factors that influence the policy process outcomes, which are different in each 
kabupaten. Other factors such as the trust and commitment of the local government and 
parliament, strong capacity of NGOs, and strong support of donors also positively influence 
the success of the process. 
 
Keywords: overseas migration, governance, decentralization 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
Background 
 
Considering the magnitude of the Indonesian workers’ outflow, the task of governing 
international migration is too huge for the central government to handle alone. Low-skilled 
female migrant workers make up no less than three quarters of the emigration profile. Adding 
to the complexity of working overseas are the human rights issues that emerge alongside the 
massive outflow of these workers employed in the domestic sphere and with the absence of 
bilateral agreements with some receiving countries. 
 
Decentralized governance of emigration is justified for several reasons. The head of the 
National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
(BNP2TKI) (2009) admitted that 80% of the problems facing the migrant workers occur 
domestically. Big problems such as identity fraud, cheat, extortion, detention, etc. happen at 
the local level and can be more effectively handled by the local government. Moreover, one of 
the tangible gains of emigration is the remittance whose impact is more influential at the local 
level than at the national level. At the same time, the pain of emigration is also more 
significantly experienced locally. It is, therefore, in the best interest of the local government to 
pursue good emigration governance to maximize the advantages and minimize the 
disadvantages of emigration. 
 
Unfortunately, the governance of Indonesia’s overseas employment is characterized by a 
centralized approach. The ones in favor of the centralized approach argue that domestic 
employment is decentralizable, while overseas employment is not. This is so because these 
two types of employment are regulated by two different laws: Law No. 13/2003 on Labor and 
Law No. 39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers. 
Moreover, the establishment of BNP2TKI as a vertical body operating the placement and 
protection of migrant workers reinforces the position of the central government in that the 
governance of overseas employment is more of a centralized matter. Moreover, Law No. 
39/2004 is never clear about the relationship between the Service Center on the Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BP3TKI) and the provincial and kabupaten 
(district)/kota (city) governments. Furthermore, Article 10 of Law No. 39/2004 authorizes the 
placement of Indonesian migrant workers to private recruitment agencies (PPTKIS) and 
Article 82 states that the preplacement protection is the responsibility of the PPTKIS, while in 
fact 90% of the PPTKIS are located in Jakarta. According to Law No. 39/2004 and 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007 on the Division of Government Affairs between 
National and Subnational Governments, the responsibilities of issuing PPTKIS’ permit and 
licensing all lie in the hands of the central government. 
 
 
Research Questions and Methodology 
 
The research poses the following questions:  
a) What justifies the initiative to formulate a perda (local regulation) on the protection of 
migrant workers at the kabupaten/kota level? 
b) What kinds of perda related to overseas employment have local governments issued so far? 
c) Is there any correlation between the number of perda related to overseas employment 
issued and the number of migrant workers? 
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d) If kabupaten/kota are given technical assistance by donor agencies through 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to formulate a protection perda, would they 
choose to legislate it? What are the enabling conditions under which kabupaten/kota are able 
to pass a protection perda? 
 
The research design follows these stages: 
a) Analysis of national and local policy frameworks. The research started with a literature 
review on a series of national laws and regulations to get the overall picture of international 
migration governance in Indonesia. An assessment was also made on the extent to which 
decentralization had triggered initiatives of local governments to improve public services. 
b) Construction of typology of perda related to overseas employment at the local level. 
To give the idea that there are various types of perda, we mapped and classified perda related 
to overseas employment based on their characteristics. Since there was no single source 
from which the official and valid list of perda in all kabupaten/kota could be extracted, the 
best approach was to find the data from various online sources. Furthermore, the number 
of migrant workers in each kabupaten/kota was aggregated from the 2005 Village Potential 
Census (Podes). For simplification, the number of migrant workers was divided into five 
quintiles. 
c) Benchmarking study in four kabupaten/kota. Blitar, Ponorogo, Lombok Barat, and 
Lombok Tengah were four migrant-source kabupaten receiving assistance from donor 
agencies to formulate protection perda. However, only Blitar and Lombok Barat now have a 
protection perda. The fieldwork involved consultation with stakeholders at the 
kabupaten/kota level. Furthermore, two focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted at 
the village level with prospective or former migrant workers, or their families: one for the 
men’s group and one for the women’s group. Additionally, in-depth interviews were 
conducted with village and kecamatan (subdistrict) officials who were in charge of 
supporting prospective migrant workers in fulfilling their administration requirements. In-
depth interviews were also carried out with the PPTKIS and migrant workers experiencing 
abuse—either prior to departure, during work, or upon arrival. Finally, one more FGD was 
carried out at the kabupaten level during which the initial findings were presented. At this 
stage, local government officials, PPTKIS, and migrant worker associations were again 
invited to give their comments and feedback. While this served as triangulation to confirm 
the initial findings, the research team made the best use of the presence of these 
stakeholders to communicate the hopes and aspirations of the migrant workers to them so 
as to initiate further policy engagement in protecting migrant workers.  
 
 
Main Findings 
 
1. Responsibilities of the local government in Law No. 39/2004  
 
Law No. 39/2004 has been strongly criticized for its bias towards the placement—rather than 
the protection—of migrant workers. Out of the 109 articles of the law, only one chapter of 8 
articles (Articles 77−84) deals with the issue of protection. Although Article 77 of the law 
defines protection as preplacement, placement, and postplacement protection, the rest of the 
provisions basically perceive protection in terms of the placement period overseas (see 
Articles 78–81) and obligate the workers to pay for the assistance and protection program (see 
Articles 83–84). In terms of preplacement protection, the law assigns the PPTKIS to be the 
agency in charge (Article 82), while the postplacement protection remains unregulated.  
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The preplacement protection against extortion and exploitation has not been well elaborated 
by Law No. 39/2004. Article 39 instructs the PPTKIS to bear all costs unless stated otherwise. 
However, according to Permenakertransi No. PER.14/MEN/X/2010, chargeable costs to the 
workers include the costs of (i) visa, (ii) food and accommodation during training, (iii) airfares, 
(iv) airport tax, (v) local transportation to the training center/shelter, (vi) insurance premium, 
and, last but not least, (vi) agency service. Indeed, no one can guarantee that the PPTKIS will 
not overcharge the migrant workers, unless there exist effective supervision by and proper 
sanctions from the government. 
 
Unfortunately, clear provisions for the supervision of the PPTKIS have been particularly 
missing in Law No. 39/2004. First, the law is inconclusive about the institutions in charge of 
supervision roles. Article 92(1) states that the government at all levels, including the local 
government, is responsible for the supervision, while Article 95 states that BNP2TKI is the 
institution in charge. Meanwhile, the delineation of authority between the government at all 
levels and BNP2TKI is far from clear. It also triggers the question whether the supervision fund 
is also shared with kabupaten/kota where BNP2TKI has no representative, except the small 
service posts in only 14 kabupaten/kota. Second, further elaboration of the provisions for the 
supervision and supervision mechanisms in the implementing legislation—as promised by 
Articles 92(3) and 93 of the law—is yet to be completed. Many years have passed since the 
enactment of the law, but the promise has not been materialized yet. Third, the supervision 
becomes more difficult to carry out at the kabupaten/kota level because Article 23 states that the 
headquarters of the PPTKIS—mostly located in Jakarta—are the ones bearing the 
responsibilities of the branch office.  
 
2. Intergovernmental responsibilities in Government Regulation No. 38/2007 
 
The central government dominates the major responsibilities outlined by Government 
Regulation No. 38/2007. Unfortunately, these responsibilities are more related to the 
placement procedure such as (i) issuing PPTKIS licenses (SIPPTKIS), (ii) giving recruitment 
recommendations, (iii) issuing mobilization permits (SIP), and (iv) appointing insurance 
companies, banks, and medical clinics. Related to the migrant workers, the responsibilities of 
the central government include (i) issuing overseas worker ID cards (KTKLN), (ii) 
constructing a computerized data system of overseas employment (SISKO TKLN), and (iii) 
carrying out final pre-departure briefings (PAP). Power struggle between the Ministry of 
Labor and Transmigration (MoLT) and BNP2TKI takes place in relation with these 
responsibilities. It is important to note that Government Regulation No. 38/2007 takes 
protection fee (of US$15/worker) seriously, as the supervision of protection fee compliance 
takes place at all levels, even at the kabupaten/kota level. However, in reality, the local 
government has nothing to do with it and cannot access its data. 
 
Meanwhile, the local government is assigned with many more responsibilities by Government 
Regulation No. 38/2007. Adding to the original responsibilities mandated by Law No. 
39/2004, Government Regulation No. 38/2007 inserts some more responsibilities that used 
to be the tasks of the PPTKIS under Law No. 39/2004 and some other responsibilities to 
support the central government’s duties.  
 
Altogether, Government Regulation No. 38/2007 outlines thirteen responsibilities of the local 
government which include (i) information dissemination, (ii) registration of workers, (iii) 
selection of workers, (iv) supervision of recruitment, (v) facilitation of bilateral and multilateral 
                                                      
iLabor and Transmigration Ministerial Regulation. 
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agreement implementation, (vi) issuance of the permit to establish a PPTKIS branch office, 
(vii) recommendation of workers’ passport, (viii) dissemination of information on SISKO 
TKLN and supervision of the protection fee compliance, (ix) socialization of the contents of 
placement and work contracts, (x) assessment and validation of the placement contract, (xi) 
assistance, supervision, and monitoring of the placement and protection of migrant workers, 
(xii) permit, and (xiii) homecoming service. 
 
It is good that the local governments are more intensively involved in emigration governance. 
Further questions to answer are whether the local governments are aware of and committed to 
these extended tasks and whether they are capable of performing them. 
 
3. Policy gap and protection perda 
 
Local initiatives in the form of the passing of protection perda are strongly needed for the 
protection of migrant workers, particularly during preplacement. Protection perda is needed for 
the following reasons. First, a perda can elaborate and specify a local government’s roles and 
responsibilities in line with the mandates of Law No. 39/2004 and Government Regulation 
No. 38/2007. 
 
Second, a perda can state the specific needs of a kabupaten/kota which cannot be 
accommodated by Law No. 39/2004. Such issues as main destinations and cost structures are 
locally specific and, therefore, can only be accommodated by a perda. For example, the 
majority of migrant workers from Lombok Barat and Lombok Tengah work in Malaysia and 
the Middle East, while their fellow migrant workers from Blitar and Ponorogo are employed 
in one of the East Asian countries. With such locally specific conditions, the perda of these 
kabupaten can specifically stipulate the cost structure in the destination country where their 
migrant workers work. 
 
Third, the process of drafting a protection perda involves civil society organizations and, 
therefore, enhances democratization. The participation of NGOs and academics in the 
process reveals one step towards improvement in governance. From a policy perspective, 
more interactions between civil society organizations, the local government, the local 
parliament, and the private sector will result in a better power balance. 
 
Fourth, a perda can clearly stipulate sanctions against violations which take place at the 
kabupaten/kota level. A perda can act as a form of shock therapy for any party that is 
accustomed to extorting, abusing, and detaining migrant workers prior to their departure. 
With strong law enforcement, the protection of migrant workers will certainly improve. 
 
Some parties are pessimistic, however, that a protection perda can effectively serve its purpose 
because, empirically speaking, its implementation and law enforcement have been far from 
sufficient. The question is now whether we should still establish a normative law whose 
implementation and enforcement are very slow or cling to the evidence and abandon the idea 
of having a perda. Based on results of interviews and FGDs with key stakeholders, the 
establishment of protection perda is urgent for the sending kabupaten/kota. The ultimate desire 
for establishing a protection perda is for the perda to serve as a guide for civil society behaviors 
and attitudes that respect migrant workers’ rights. The passing of a protection perda should go 
hand in hand with public pressure for effective implementation. 
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4. Typology and mapping analysis of perda related to overseas employment 
 
We constructed a typology of two general types of perda related to overseas employment: 
nonspecific (extractive) and specific (nonextractive) perda. For the specific ones, the perda can 
be grouped into four types of perda: type-1, type-2, type-3, and type-4 perda. 
 
Type-1 perda focus on charges for general employment, including overseas employment.  
These charges are paid either by the worker or the company. Type-2 perda are about general 
kabupaten/kota revenues, including those from overseas employment. They are formulated 
more generally than type-1 perda, and therefore, their charges are paid by even larger groups of 
people. Type-3 perda deal with the procedure for the placement of overseas workers. It does 
not rule any financial consequences to be borne either by the migrant worker or the PPTKIS. 
In some cases, the title of the perda explicitly mentions the protection of migrant workers, 
while the content regulates the placement procedure heavily; therefore, this type is categorized 
separately from type-4 perda. Type-4 perda are concerned with the protection of migrant 
workers. It does not entail any charge and concentrates on what has not been ruled in the 
national law. These protection perda mandates the establishment of a protection commission: a 
specialized body which expedites the handling of abuse and extortion cases, mediates between 
various stakeholders, and issues warnings when violations of migrant workers’ rights occur. 
 
In the mapping analysis, we found the following. First, in general, there exists a correlation 
between kabupaten/kota having perda related to overseas employment and kabupaten/kota 
having a large number of migrant workers. Second, surprisingly, many kabupaten/kota which 
have few migrant workers (quintiles 1 to 3) pass type-1 and type-2 perda. These kabupaten/kota 
are located close to the borders with Malaysia and Brunei and have become migrant workers’ 
transit areas. Moreover, type-1 and type-2 perda are also applicable to kabupaten/kota with 
domestic migrant workers from whom the local governments are also eager to levy. Because 
of these features, type-1 and type-2 perda tend to spread in all kabupaten/kota regardless of their 
number of migrant workers. Third, out of the 127 perda, a majority of 81.1% and 14.2% fall in 
type-1 and type-2 perda respectively, while only 2.4% are type-4 perda. Moreover, out of the 82 
migrant-source kabupaten/kota only 3 kabupaten/kota (3.7%) have a protection perda, while 34 
kabupaten/kota (41.5%) are more interested in passing extractive perda. Therefore, the 
awareness of the local governments to take the initiative to protect their migrant workers is 
still far from adequate. Fourth, this typology we have made is not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Having the ultimate protection perda does not necessarily mean not having 
extractive perda. Apparently, kabupaten/kota that pass protection perda do not cancel their 
extractive perda. Therefore, the kabupaten/kota may protect their migrant workers but, at the 
same time, violate the law by taxing the workers, directly or indirectly.  
 
5. Policy process of a protection perda and its enabling conditions  
 
Our field research shows that each case of policy process is unique. It is so unique that the 
outcome cannot be explained in a standard model that applies for each observed kabupaten. 
The duration of the policy process that was too short for Ponorogo or too long for Blitar was 
apparently poor. However, the optimal duration for Lombok Barat did not apply for Lombok 
Tengah. The fact that Lombok Barat perda used Law No. 39/2004 as its substance was the 
reason for its rejection in Lombok Tengah. However, the substance of the perda in Blitar that 
was innovative was also the reason why the local government and PPTKIS were resistant to it. 
Furthermore, taking the position of policy contestation for NGOs turned to be successful in 
Blitar, but not in Ponorogo. In the case of Lombok Barat, the position of policy engagement 
proved to be more effective for NGOs, although this was not the case for Lombok Tengah. 
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The intervention of the PPTKIS could be counterbalanced by the high commitment of the 
parliament. In Ponorogo, the PPTKIS had a close relation with members of the parliament 
who blocked the inclusion of the raperda (perda bill) in the prolegda (local legislation program). 
In West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) Province, the PPTKIS was not aware of the raperda. With this 
favorable context, the perda in Lombok Barat succeeded to be legislated, but not in Lombok 
Tengah. The timing of elections in Blitar and Lombok Barat turned to be advantageous in the 
approval of the perda. In the cases of Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah, the timing was not 
favorable. However, the timing of an election can also be detrimental in the implementation 
of a perda. In Lombok Barat, the legislated perda had to wait until the election events were over. 
 
Apart from the abovementioned factors, we found that (i) the trust and commitment of the 
local government and parliament, (ii) the strong capacity of NGOs, and (iii) the strong 
support of donor agencies are common factors that positively influence the success of perda 
legislation. The commitment of the local governments, in particular, is essential in the 
implementation phase. Therefore, engaging them from the onset is key to the effective 
execution of the mandate of the perda. At the same time, the frequent transfers of government 
staff without fit and proper considerations are damaging to the delivery of public services, 
including that in the protection of migrant workers. Finally, the strong support of donor 
agencies is equally essential since local NGOs alone would not be able to encourage the local 
governments to protect the migrant workers. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
1. Revision of Law No. 39/2004 is a must in order to make the local governments’ roles in 
the protection of migrant workers more effective. The revised law should clearly stipulate 
the local governments’ roles in the aspects of supervision (Article 92) and supervisory 
mechanism (Article 93). Furthermore, the authority of the local government in protecting 
migrant workers can only be enhanced if Article 23 of the law is deleted. With this, the 
local government can then impose sanctions on the branch office of PPTKIS in breach of 
the law and regulation. 
2. Perda on retribusiii that charge migrant workers should be annulled. Perda on retribusi that 
excessively charge the PPTKIS should also be reviewed, as the PPTKIS will eventually 
transfer the costs to the migrant workers. It is the responsibility of the local government to 
provide regular services to the workers free of charge as a reflection of its accountability to 
its citizens. 
3. The migrant-source kabupaten should regularly be updated with the most recent legal 
framework. This is particularly important, as the central government has been changing 
policies and regulations very frequently. One should not assume that the local governments 
will automatically be aware of the policy changes at the national level without proper 
socialization. 
4. Enormous tasks for the local governments as outlined by both Law No. 39/2004 and 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007 should consequently increase the budget allocated to 
migrant-source kabupaten. At the same time, these areas—through their migrant workers—
have long paid US$15/worker to the central government for the so-called assistance and 
protection program. If the local governments are to help improve the protection of 
migrant workers during the recruitment phase, it is more than justified if the central 
government adds its financial support to the local governments. Also, it is only fair if the 
                                                      
iiRetribusi is officially a user charge that is collected as payment in return for a service. However, in practice, it 
includes other nontax charges collected by the government. 
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US$15 fund per worker is channeled back to its origin, namely the migrant-source 
kabupaten, to develop a sustainable protection mechanism and help reduce 80% of all the 
upstream problems. This is particularly applicable in the case of a kabupaten with a 
protection perda. 
5. Lombok Barat, along with its protection commission, can serve as a a good model. 
However, prior to its replication in other migrant-source kabupaten, the model needs to be 
tested first. The protection commission itself is an ad hoc body whose expertise in the long 
run has to be transferred to the labor and transmigration agency. In this regard, SMERU 
recommends a pilot project supporting the protection commission by means of the 
Specific Allocation Fund (DAK) and/or the Deconcentration Fund (Dana Dekon). To start 
with, Lombok Barat can be the pilot area.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background  
 
The governance of international migration in the context of decentralization is somewhat a 
dilemma. Debate occurs particularly on the issue of whether it is a decentralized or centralized 
matter. It is debatable because overseas employment lies both in the areas of employment and 
foreign affairs. Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Governance stipulates that employment is a 
decentralized matter, while foreign affairs are not.  
 
The governance of Indonesia’s overseas employment is in fact characterized by a centralized 
approach. One can obviously see it from the following angles. First, the ones in favor of the 
centralized governance usually make use of Articles 33 and 34 of Law No. 13/2003 on Labor 
(Naekma and Pageh, 2009). These articles differentiate domestic employment from the 
overseas employment, leaving the latter to be regulated by another law, which is Law No. 
39/2004 on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers. Based on these 
provisions, these people then argue that domestic employment is decentralizable, while 
overseas employment is not. 
 
Second, the establishment of a vertical body as the operator of the placement and protection 
of migrant workers reinforces the position of the central government in that the governance 
of overseas employment is more of a centralized matter.1 The National Agency for the 
Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers (BNP2TKI) has representative 
offices called BP3TKI (Service Centers on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian 
Migrant Workers) in 19 migrant-source provinces. It has no representative at the kabupaten 
(district)/kota (city) level, except the small service posts in 14 selected kabupaten/kota 
(BNP2TKI, 2011).2 Moreover, Law No. 39/2004 is never clear about the relationship between 
BP3TKI and the provincial and kabupaten/kota governments. 
 
Third, Article 10 of Law No. 39/2004 authorizes the placement of Indonesian migrant 
workers to private recruitment agencies (PPTKIS) and Article 82 states that the preplacement 
protection is the responsibility of the PPTKIS.3 Meanwhile, 90% of the PPTKIS are located in 
Jakarta. According to Law No. 39/2004 and Government Regulation No. 38/2007 (see Table 
A1 of Appendix 1), the responsibilities of issuing PPTKIS’ permit and licensing all lie in the 
hands of the central government.  
 
On the other hand, the decentralized governance of emigration is justified for several reasons. 
First, BNP2TKI (2009) admitted that 80% of the problems facing the migrant workers occur 
domestically. Serious problems such as identity fraud, cheat, extortion, and detention happen 
at the local level and can actually be more effectively handled by the local government.  
 
 
                                                      
1BNP2TKI is one of the mandates of Law No. 39/2004. It was established in 2007 with Presidential Regulation 
No. 81/2006 on National Agency for the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers. 
2These small offices are called Service Posts on the Placement and Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 
(P4TKI). 
3About 90% of the total annual placements are the ones organized by the PPTKIS under the Private-to-Private 
contract arrangement. The rest are organized by BNP2TKI under the Government-to-Government contract 
arrangement. 
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Second, one of the tangible gains of emigration is the remittance whose impact is more 
influential at the local level than at the national level. At the same time, the pain of emigration 
is also more significantly experienced locally. It is, therefore, in the best interest of the local 
governments to pursue good emigration governance to maximize the advantages and 
minimize the disadvantages of emigration. 
 
 
1.2 Research Objectives and Questions  
 
The research combines literature review and fieldwork with the following objectives: 
a) To analyze the nature of the decentralization of emigration governance; 
b) To construct a typology of various perda (local regulations) related to overseas employment 
that are the initiatives of kabupaten/kota; 
c) To conduct a mapping analysis of perda related to overseas employment; and 
d) To assess the enabling conditions under which some kabupaten/kota are able to pass 
protection perda for their migrant workers. 
 
Specifically, the research poses the following questions:  
a) What justifies the initiative to formulate perda on the protection of migrant workers at the 
kabupaten/kota level? 
b) What kinds of perda related to overseas employment have the local governments issued so far? 
c) Is there any correlation between the number of perda-related overseas employment issued 
and the number of migrant workers?  
d) If kabupaten/kota are given technical assistance by donor agencies through nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) to formulate a protection perda, would they choose to legislate it? What 
are the enabling conditions under which kabupaten/kota are able to pass a protection perda? 
 
 
1.3 Research Methodology  
 
1.3.1 National and Local Policy Frameworks 
 
The research started with a document and literature review on policy frameworks. In this 
phase, a series of national laws and regulations were assessed to get the overall picture of 
international migration governance. Focus was given particularly to the nature of authority 
transfer of migration governance from the central government to the local government, if one 
existed. An assessment was made on the extent of decentralization in Indonesia. The law on 
regional governance as well as Law No. 39/2004, along with their implementing legislation, 
were thoroughly studied. 
 
1.3.2 Typology of Perda Related to Overseas Employment at the Local Level 
 
To give the idea that there are various types of perda related to overseas employment at the 
kabupaten/kota level, the research team mapped and classified the perda based on their 
characteristics. At the national level, however, there was no single source from which the 
official and valid list of perda in all kabupaten/kota was made available. Therefore, the best 
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approach was to find the data from various online sources, comprising Gudang Hukum 
Indonesia4, KPPOD5, Legalitas.Org6. 
 
The team was interested in finding out whether kabupaten/kota with a bigger size of migrant 
workers also issued a higher number of perda related to overseas employment. The number of 
migrant workers in each kabupaten/kota was aggregated from the 2005 Village Potential Census 
(Podes).7 For simplification, the number of migrant workers was divided into five quintiles. 
 
1.3.3 Fieldwork 
 
The fieldwork was conducted in four kabupaten to examine the policy process behind the 
existence or nonexistence of perda focusing on migrant protection. The migrant-source 
kabupaten were chosen purposively to include two kabupaten with a protection perda and two 
kabupaten without it. East Java and West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) were picked out, as both are 
provinces where most migrant workers originate. Blitar (East Java) and Lombok Barat (NTB) 
are kabupaten with a protection perda. Their neighboring kabupaten, Ponorogo (East Java) and 
Lombok Tengah (NTB) are kabupaten without a protection perda, although both already had 
the bill version of the protection perda. Indeed, all four kabupaten—through several advocating 
NGOs—received technical assistance from donor agencies to formulate a protection perda. 
 
However, implementation problems of the protection perda in Blitar and Lombok Barat had 
inhibited the observation of the impact of the perda on the protection of migrant workers. The 
dispute between stakeholders in Blitar, in particular between the advocating NGOs and the 
local government, hampered the process of recording Perda No. 16/2008 in the kabupaten 
legislation book. A solution to the difference of opinions resulted in the perda being revised. 
Meanwhile, Perda No. 5/2008 of Lombok Barat had been implemented slowly owing to the 
general elections as well as the kabupaten executive and legislative elections. The protection 
commission was only inaugurated by the bupati (kabupaten head) at the time of the fieldwork. 
For this reason, the fieldwork only observed the local reform on paper rather than in practice. 
 
The initial part of the fieldwork involved consultations with local government officials, local 
NGOs, migrant workers’ associations, and the PPTKIS. In this part, perspectives regarding 
key issues in the area of international migration were explored. Meanwhile, migrant workers’ 
statistics from Statistics Indonesia (BPS) at the kabupaten level and from the BP3TKI were also 
collected for further reference. 
 
At the village level, prospective migrant workers, former migrant workers, or their families 
were invited to focus group discussions (FGDs) to discuss the emigration issues they had 
encountered. These village-level FGDs were segregated by gender: one for men and one for 
women. Additionally, in-depth interviews were held with village and kecamatan (subdistrict) 
officials in charge of administrative requirements for prospective migrant workers. In-depth 
interviews were also carried out with the PPTKIS and migrant workers experiencing abuse—
either prior to departure, during work, or upon arrival in Indonesia. 
 
                                                      
4http://gudanghukumindonesia.blogspot.com/. 
5http://www.kppod.org/. 
6http://www.legalitas.org/. 
7The 2005 Podes involved not less than 75,000 villages. 
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The initial findings from the consultations with stakeholders and village-level FGDs were then 
presented in the kabupaten-level FGDs. At this stage, local government officials, the PPTKIS, 
and migrant workers’ associations were invited again to give their comments and feedback. 
While this served as triangulation to confirm the initial findings, the research team made the 
best use of their presence by presenting the hopes and aspirations of migrant workers and 
initiating further policy engagement in protecting migrant workers. Thus, in total, the 
fieldwork in the four kabupaten involved 12 FGDs (two with migrant workers and one with 
kabupaten-level stakeholders for each kabupaten). 
 
 
1.4 Limitations of the Research 
 
First of all, the fast growth phenomenon of perda after decentralization is not typical to the 
kabupaten/kota level. At the provincial level, there are many perda that are passed by the 
provincial parliament. However, since the scope of the study is limited to the kabupaten/kota 
level, we will not discuss perda at the provincial level.  
 
Second, the research had been limited by access to the official copy of perda. Therefore, the 
only proxy was the reported list of perda related to overseas employment available online. The 
list includes the legislation number of the perda and their title. Sometimes online sources 
provide the copy of the perda, but, most of the time, only the number and the title (see Table 
A3 of Appendix 1). This means that the list of 127 perda makes up only some parts of the 
hundreds of perda out there that the research team could not extract. Our findings, then, only 
indicate the characteristics of the reported perda. Furthermore, the current status of these 
online perda is not regularly updated. However, since our purpose is only to map and classify 
all ever-made perda related to overseas employment, the current status becomes of less 
importance.  
 
Third, the research did not observe the implementation of the perda since it was conducted not 
long after the establishment of the perda, while the implementation phase took place very 
slowly. Therefore, in the case of Blitar and Lombok Barat, the research only focused on their 
textual analysis. This exercise was considered to be important as the rationale behind the 
passing of protection perda as well as the lessons learned for other migrant-source 
kabupaten/kota wishing to prepare their protection perda. 
 
 
1.5 Structure of the Report 
 
Chapter 1 presents background information which is the basic arguments of centralized versus 
decentralized emigration governance. It also briefly states methodological issues, such as the 
research objectives and questions, the research design, and the limitation of the research. 
Chapter 2 discusses more detailed information on the local governments’ roles and 
responsibilities according to Law No. 39/2004 and Government Regulation No. 38/2007. In 
Chapter 3, the research team constructs a typology of varieties of perda related to overseas 
employment. Here, it conducts the mapping analysis and draws some interesting results. 
Furthermore, it discusses the findings of the fieldwork in Chapter 4. Specifically, it conducts a 
textual analysis of the perda of Blitar and Lombok Barat and elaborates the legal drafting 
process before drawing some lessons on the enabling conditions under which the perda of 
both kabupaten could be passed. 
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II. NATIONAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
 
 
This chapter basically reviews Law No. 39/2004. Focus is particularly given to one of its 
weaknesses, its delineation of authority problem. The chapter starts with the review of 
weaknesses in the law. The problem of intergovernmental relationship in Government 
Regulation No. 38/2007 is also overviewed. Furthermore, a lack of delineation of 
authority at the central level triggers dualism and power struggle between the Ministry of 
Labor and Transmigration (MoLT) and BNP2TKI. Since this study’s primary concerns lie 
with the kabupaten/kota government, the discussion will only cover problems at the 
kabupaten/kota level. Further subchapters are about the missing elements of Law No. 
39/2004, which elicit policy gaps that need to be potentially filled by the kabupaten/kota 
government. 
 
 
2.1 The Local Government’s Responsibilities in Law No. 39/2004  
 
The principle criticism against Law No. 39/2004 deals with its bias towards the placement 
rather than the protection of migrant workers. The law reflects that emigration is regarded by 
the government simply as a business matter and, therefore, the placement of as many migrant 
workers as possible is what is desired. The lack of provisions for the protection of migrant 
workers within the law is obvious for the following reasons. 
 
Out of the 109 articles of the law, only one chapter of eight articles (Articles 77−84) deal with 
migrant workers’ protection. Although Article 77 of the law defines protection as 
preplacement, placement, and postplacement protection, the rest of the provisions in the 
chapter basically perceive protection in terms of the placement period overseas (Articles 78–
81) and obligate migrant workers to pay for the assistance and protection program (Articles 
83–84). In terms of preplacement protection, the law assigns the PPTKIS as the agency in 
charge (Article 82). The postplacement protection remains untouched.  
 
Preplacement protection against extortion and exploitation has not been clearly elaborated by 
Law No. 39/2004. Article 39 of the law instructs the PPTKIS to bear all costs, unless stated 
otherwise. However, Article 76 Clauses (1) and (2) state that the PPTKIS can charge the costs 
of (i) identity documents processing, (ii) health and psychological tests, (iii) job training and 
professional certificates, and (iv) “others”. The term “others” is then explained by 
Permenakertrans8 No. PER.14/MEN/X/2010 to be (i) visa, (ii) food and accommodation 
during training, (iii) airfare, (iv) airport tax, (v) local transportation to the training 
center/shelter, (vi) insurance premium, and, last but not least, (vi) agency service fee. 
Furthermore, Article 76 (3) says that these costs must be administered transparently. No one 
can guarantee that the PPTKIS will not overcharge the migrant workers, unless there exist 
effective supervision by and proper sanctions from the government. 
 
Unfortunately, clear provisions for the supervision of the PPTKIS have been particularly 
missing in the law. This is so because of several reasons. First, Law No. 39/2004 is 
inconclusive about the institutions in charge of supervision roles. Article 92 (1) of the law 
states that the government at all levels, including the local government, is responsible for the 
supervision, while Article 95 says that it is BNP2TKI’s. Meanwhile, the delineation of 
authority between the government at all levels and BNP2TKI is far from clear (see Box 1). 
                                                      
8Labor and Transmigration Ministerial Regulation. 
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Moreover, this triggers the question whether the supervision fund is also shared with 
kabupaten/kota where BNP2TKI has no representative, except the small service posts in only 
14 kabupaten/kota.  
 
Box 1 
One-stop Service in West Nusa Tenggara: Central or Provincial Authority? 
 
West Nusa Tenggara (NTB) Province was the first province to have a one-stop service (OSS) for migrant 
workers. Although the idea had been brought to the fore since 2000, the concept was officially adopted only in 
2008 when the key stakeholders—the governor of NTB, the head of BNP2TKI, and the head of NTB’s Labor 
and Transmigration Agency—met officially in Mataram. On 15 December 2008, the governor of NTB passed 
Gubernatorial Regulation No. 32/2008 on the OSS of Placement and Protection of NTB Migrant Workers to 
officially mark the establishment of the OSS. 
 
Considering the complexity of bureaucracy, the main mandate that the OSS bears is to integrate and, 
therefore, streamline the documentation services at the provincial level. With the existence of the OSS, 
migrant workers are supposed to get various services in one place. They can get information service, receive 
an overseas worker ID card (KTKLN), pay their compulsory US$15 assistance and protection fee, pay the 
insurance premium, get a tax-free letter, attend pre-departure training, and receive their work contract, all in 
one place.9 Therefore, the OSS accommodates a number of agencies, namely the BP3TKI, NTB’s Labor and 
Transmigration Agency, the provincial tax office, and the insurance company. 
 
While the existence of the OSS reflects a solid partnership between the central and provincial governments, it 
has so far been an ad hoc institution with ambiguous authority.10 Changing its status to a permanent one will 
require institutional clarity. If the OSS is to become a provincial technical implementation unit, it should be under 
the authority of NTB’s Labor and Transmigration Agency. If it is to become an independent provincial agency, it 
should have its own staff members who are capable of running its daily operation. Indeed, at present, the OSS 
resides in one of NTB’s government-owned properties, while its office is run by ten staff members of the BP3TKI 
and two staff members of NTB’s Labor and Transmigration Agency. Since the BP3TKI staff work for the central 
government, the possibility of transforming the OSS into a provincial agency is less likely. 
 
Source: In-depth interviews with Susilo (Koslata official, male, about 50 years old, 24 October 2010); Sentot (BP3TKI 
official, male, about 50 years old, 19 October 2010); Bobby (LBH-APIK11 Mataram official, male, about 40 years old, 25 
October 2010); and Bakri (chairman of the PPTKIS Association in NTB, about 50 years old, 25 October 2010). 
 
Second, provisions for the supervision (Article 92 (3)) and supervision mechanisms (Article 
93) are yet to be completed. Article 92 (3) promises to further elaborate the supervision 
provision in a government regulation. Seven years had passed since the enactment of Law No. 
39/2004, but the promise had not been materialized yet. Similarly, the reporting mechanism of 
the supervision—being the responsibility of the government at all levels—is stipulated 
generally in Article 93 the details of which are to be specified in a ministerial regulation. Again, 
until now, the details have not been made in any ministerial regulation. 
 
Third, the supervision becomes more difficult to carry out at the kabupaten/kota level due to 
Article 23’s stipulating that the headquarters of the PPTKIS are the ones that bear the 
responsibilities of the branch office. Meanwhile, the majority of the PPTKIS operate their 
                                                      
9Before 2011, each Indonesian citizen leaving the country had to bear the tax of Rp1,500,000, unless owning a 
Tax Identification Number (NPWP). In early 2011, this tax was officially cancelled. Information on the 
cancellation had not yet reached some PPTKIS during the time of the interview. 
10Permenakertrans No. PER.14/MEN/X/2010 does say that the OSS is coordinated by the governor as the 
representative of the central government. The governor would coordinate the BP3TKI, provincial and kabupaten 
labor and transmigration agencies, and other relevant institutions. This permenakertrans, however, does not address 
the authority question. 
11LBH-APIK = Legal Aid Institute-Association of Indonesian Women for Justice. 
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business from Jakarta and only some of them establish branches at the kabupaten/kota level. 
This provision makes it difficult for the local government to prosecute branch offices of the 
PPTKIS that are in violation of the law. 
 
 
2.2 Intergovernmental Responsibilities  
 
Being one of the implementing regulations of Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Governance, 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007 assigns certain authorities to the central government 
(see column 1 of Table A1 in the Appendices section). Assessment of the central 
government’s roles in this regulation can be summarized as follows. 
 
First, the centralized characteristics of the regulation can be seen from major responsibilities 
being dominated by the central government. These responsibilities are related to the 
placement procedure rather than the protection of migrant workers. For example, at the 
central level, the official procedure related to the PPTKIS includes the issuance of (i) PPTKIS 
licenses (SIPPTKIS), (ii) recruitment recommendations, and (iii) mobilization permits (SIP) as 
well as (iv) the appointment of insurance companies, banks, and medical clinics. On the other 
hand, the procedure related to migrant workers incorporates the issuance of KTKLN, the 
computerized data system of overseas employment (SISKO TKLN), and the final pre-
departure briefing (PAP). These are the areas where both the MoLT and BNP2TKI are 
interested in. 
 
Second, the placement procedure has little to do with protection. On the other hand, there are 
areas where the placement procedure overlaps with protection and they are apparently not areas 
where power struggle at the central level takes place. These areas include the (i) formulation of 
bilateral and multilateral agreements, (ii) setting up of the working contract standard, and (iii) 
setting up of the standard of shelters and training centers for overseas employment (BLK-LN). 
 
Third, Government Regulation No. 38/2007 takes the protection fee of US$15/migrant 
worker seriously, as the supervision of protection fee compliance takes place at all levels, even 
at the kabupaten/kota level. However, in reality, the local government has nothing to do with 
this fund and cannot access its data. 
 
In addition, Government Regulation No. 38/2007 also assigns the local government to support 
the roles of the central government. The local government is mainly responsible for activities 
during the preplacement stage, such as the various activities in the recruitment of migrant 
workers (see column 3 of Table A1). 
 
Law No. 39/2004 delegates the following responsibilities to the kabupaten/kota government: 
a) Recruitment process: (1) to have prospective migrant workers registered (Article 36) and 
(2) regarding the placement contract between prospective migrant workers and the 
PPTKIS: (a) to be informed of the existence of a placement contract (Article 38) and (b) 
to get a copy of the placement contract (Article 54). 
b) PPTKIS license: to have the PPTKIS registered (Article 37). 
c) Passport recommendation: to give recommendation to prospective migrant workers for 
their passport application (Explanation of Article 51 (f)). 
d) Mediation of disputes: to assist in mediating between disputing parties (Article 85). 
e) Supervision: (1) to supervise the placement and protection of migrant workers (Article 92) 
and (2) to submit the report on the results of the supervision to the minister (Article 93). 
f) Investigation of violations: to act as an investigator in case of a violation (Article 101). 
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Comparing the responsibilities of the local government stipulated by Law No. 39/2004 and 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007, one can see that the latter is more extended than the 
former (see Table A2 of Appendix 1). Some local government responsibilities outlined in 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007 are indeed the responsibilities of the PPTKIS as per Law 
No. 39/2004, while some other responsibilities are not mentioned in Law No. 39/2004. Thus, 
we can divide the responsibilities outlined in Government Regulation No. 38/2007 into three 
categories (Table 1). 
 
Table 1. Division of the Local Government’s Responsibilities according to 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007 
(1) Responsibilities which are 
consistent with Law No. 39/2004 
(b) Responsibilities which are 
inconsistent (mentioned as the 
PPTKIS’ responsibilities in Law 
No. 39/2004) 
(c) Additional responsibilities 
(not mentioned in Law No. 
39/2004) 
Registration (A. 36 & A. 37)  Registration (A. 22)  
Facilitation of the implementation 
of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements 
Supervision of recruitment (A. 92)  Information dissemination (A. 22)  
Information dissemination 
regarding SISKO TKLN and 
supervision of protection fee 
(US$15) compliance 
Permit to establish a PPTKIS 
branch office (A. 21 & A. 37)  
Selection of migrant workers (A. 
22)  
Socialization of the content of work 
and placement contracts 
Passport recommendation (A. 51)  Homecoming service (A. 75)  Assessment and validation of placement contracts  
Permit to establish a PPTKIS 
shelter (A. 70)    
Assistance, supervision, 
monitoring (A. 92)    
Source: Government Regulation No. 38/2007 and Law No. 39/2004. 
Note:A. = Article. 
 
Critical questions about these findings are twofold: (i) Are local governments aware of and 
committed to their extended responsibilities? (ii) Are they capable of carrying out these 
responsibilities? 
 
 
2.3 Policy Gap and Support for the Local Government’s Initiatives 
 
Komnas Perempuan, The Institute for Ecosoc Rights, United Nations Development Fund for 
Women (UNIFEM), and Migrant Care maintain their support for the decentralization of 
emigration governance.12 For these NGOs, Law No. 32/2004 concerning Regional 
Governance is sufficient to back up the idea of transferring power, finance, and administration 
to the kabupaten/kota government. Komnas Perempuan, for example, has explicitly specificed 
that gender and human rights issues are missing in Law No. 39/2004 and, therefore, 
advocated the formulation of perda with the perspectives of gender and human rights 
                                                      
12This information was obtained from interviews with Nita (NGO activist, female, about 30 years old, 2 October 
2009), Cici (NGO activist, female, 35 years old, 5 October 2009), Ida (NGO activist, female, about 45 years old, 
23 October 2009), Wiwik (NGO activist, female, about 45 years old, 1 April 2010), and Indah (NGO activist, 
female, about 35 years old, 19 April 2010). 
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(Komnas Perempuan, 2006a and 2006b). The Institute for Ecosoc Rights and Trade Union 
Rights Center (2008a) has also assisted Kabupaten Banyumas, Kabupaten Jember, and 
Kabupaten Tulang Bawang in formulating their perda considering that the provisions for 
protection are almost entirely absent in Law No. 39/2004. Since employment is an obligatory 
matter for the kabupaten/kota government (Article 14(1) of the law), it must not disregard the 
protection of overseas workers. Both the domestic and overseas workers are the citizens of 
Indonesia and are no different in terms of their rights. The kabupaten/kota government is 
obliged to provide them with the necessary services and protection while they are still within 
its jurisdiction. 
 
Furthermore, it is definitely not recommendable to delay the protection of migrant workers 
until the national policy becomes perfect. Instead, improvements at the national and local 
levels have to be made side by side. Local initiatives have a great potential to fill in the existing 
national policy gaps in terms of protection, particularly the preplacement protection. 
Protection perda is needed for the following reasons. First, a perda can elaborate and specify a 
local government’s roles and responsibilities in line with the mandates of Law No. 39/2004 
and Government Regulation No. 38/2007. 
 
Second, a perda can state the specific needs of a kabupaten/kota which cannot be 
accommodated by Law No. 39/2004. Such issues as main destinations and cost structures are 
locally specific; therefore, a perda can deal with these issues. For example, the majority of 
migrant workers from Lombok Barat and Lombok Tengah work in Malaysia and the Middle 
East, while their fellow migrant workers from Blitar and Ponorogo work in East Asia. With 
such locally specific conditions, the perda of these kabupaten can specifically stipulate the cost 
structure in the destination country where their migrant workers work. 
 
Third, the process of drafting a protection perda involves civil society organizations and, 
therefore, enhances democratization. The participation of NGOs and academics in the 
process reveals one step towards improvement in governance. From a policy perspective, 
more interactions between civil society organizations, the local government, the local 
parliament, and the private sector will result in a better power balance. 
 
Fourth, a perda can clearly stipulate sanctions against violations which take place at the 
kabupaten/kota level. A perda can act as a form of shock therapy for any party that is 
accustomed to extorting, abusing, and detaining migrant workers prior to their departure. 
With strong law enforcement, the protection of migrant workers will certainly improve. 
 
Some parties are pessimistic, however, that a protection perda can effectively serve its purpose 
because, empirically speaking, its implementation and law enforcement have been far from 
sufficient. The question is now whether we should still establish a normative law whose 
implementation and enforcement are very slow or cling to the evidence and abandon the idea 
of having a perda. Based on results of interviews and FGDs with key stakeholders, the 
establishment of protection perda is urgent for the sending kabupaten/kota. The ultimate desire 
for establishing a protection perda is for the perda to serve as a guide for civil society behaviors 
and attitudes that respect migrant workers’ rights. The passing of a protection perda should go 
hand in hand with public pressure for effective implementation. If Indonesians do not respect 
their fellow citizens working abroad, what kind of treatment do we expect Indonesian migrant 
workers will receive in their destination countries? 
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III. TYPOLOGY AND MAPPING ANALYSIS OF PERDA 
RELATED TO OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
To explain the general regulatory framework at the kabupaten level, this chapter particularly 
analyzes perda related to overseas employment. First, it discusses the general fast-growing 
phenomenon of perda on taxes and retribusi after the onset of decentralization in 2001.13 While 
most of the perda related to business and investment are considered bad for public service 
delivery, as they impose fees, perda related to overseas employment can be either extractive or 
nonextractive. Therefore, constructing a typology of these perda is necessary before doing the 
mapping analysis. The mapping analysis itself is an exercise where kabupaten according to perda 
type are overlaid with kabupaten according to the number of migrant workers. Finally, findings 
from the mapping analysis will reveal common regulations related to overseas employment. 
 
 
3.1 Regional Autonomy and Perda on Taxes and Retribusi 
 
The decentralization framework is centered around political, administrative, and fiscal matters 
which are explained in two very important laws: Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Governance 
and Law No. 33/204 on Fiscal Balance. In political and administrative matters, the local 
government has to assume the responsibility to provide public services, including 
employment. In financial and fiscal matters, a certain budget allocation is granted to the local 
government based on a set of predetermined criteria. 
 
These two legal pillars are backed by various implementing regulations. According to Mahi 
(2002), one of the most important supports is Law No. 34/2000 on Local Taxes and Retribusi 
(PDRD). Law No. 34/2000 allowed flexibility for the local government to generate local 
revenues. Through perda, the local government can impose taxes and retribusi without the 
approval of the central government. 
 
However, having the objective of maximizing its revenue, rather than optimizing it, every 
kabupaten/kota government tends to make the best use of Law No. 34/2000 by formulating 
perda on taxes and retribusi at the cost of long-term investment. Coupled with the euphoria of 
regional autonomy, the open-list nature of Law No. 34/2000, apparently, has given room to 
the local government to exercise its power. Moreover, the freedom to issue perda to increase 
local revenues has been misunderstood by the local government as a symbol of independence 
from the central government (Mawardi et al., 2009). Meanwhile, opportunities for local 
governments to work together in one free economic zone and formulate a common economic 
policy have been so far almost out of the question. These will eventually obstruct local 
investment, create high-cost economy, reduce Indonesia’ competitiveness, and weaken the 
nation’s integrity (Soesastro, 2001). At the same time, the span of control of the central 
government over the so-called problematic perda is notoriously weak, particularly in the 
context of 524 kabupaten/kota (Directorate-General of Fiscal Balance, 2008).14 
 
The 2000s saw a booming of problematic perda, which was considered one of the side effects of 
decentralization on business enabling environment. The phenomenon of problematic perda has 
                                                      
13Retribusi is officially a user charge that is collected as payment in return for a service. However, in practice, it 
includes other nontax charges collected by the government. 
14The latest data. 
The SMERU Research Institute 11
been intensively discussed and has become a national concern. Business communities have 
heavily complained, urging the central government to cancel these perda. Indeed, these perda 
encompass taxes and retribusi across sectors ranging from agriculture, trade, industry, 
transportation, communication, employment, etc. In general, they might appear as perda on 
business license, perda on the distribution of goods and services, and perda on general 
administration fees (Bachtiar et al., 2009). Many times, the business communities have to pay 
double taxes horizontally (across different sectors) and vertically (at the central and local levels). 
 
The central government has been criticized for its slow action to revoke problematic perda that 
clearly distort the investment climate. The speed of the cancellation cannot keep up with the 
speed of issuing new perda. After many years of pros and cons, in late 2009, the parliament 
finally passed the revision of Law No. 34/2000, which was Law No. 28/2009 on PDRD. 
Unlike Law No. 34/2000, Law No. 28/2009 employs a closed-list system where only the listed 
taxes and retribusi are allowed to be imposed locally. Moreover, kabupaten/kota governments 
should seek assistance and approval from the provincial government before issuing new perda. 
Two years have been given to kabupaten/kota governments to terminate the problematic perda, 
which are not included on the list of the new law. 
 
 
3.2 Typology of Perda Related to Overseas Employment 
 
There are multiple ways of grouping perda which regulate decentralized responsibilities. One 
possible way is to categorize them based on what they regulate; another is by categorizing them 
based on their fee implication. Jaweng (2006) highlighted four categories of perda (Figure 1). He 
echoed that, except for the category of perda related to government organization, there are three 
other categories of perda (in particular those related to economic activities) that most likely have fee 
implications through tax, retribusi, voluntary contribution, or, at the very least, penalty for violation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. General categories of perda 
Perda regulating 
Decentralized 
Responsibilities 
(Law No. 32/2004) 
Four groups of perda (Jaweng, 2006) 
(1) Perda on Government Organization 
(2) Perda on Civil Administration 
(3) Perda on Economic and Business Activities 
(4) Perda on Social Life 
 
Two groups of perda (Law No.34/2000) 
(1)  Perda on Local Taxes 
(2)  Perda on Retribusi 
  (2a)   Public Services 
  (2b)   Business Services 
  (2c)   Specific Licensing 
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Being one of the decentralized responsibilities, employment is also the area where 
kabupaten/kota governments can possibly extract levies. Although this violates the law, many 
local governments insist on collecting them. Particularly for migrant-source kabupaten/kota, the 
tendency to levy is very high. 
 
The local government can levy migrant workers in various ways. First, it can levy them directly 
through administration fees (i) when they file an official registration as an employment seeker 
and (ii) when they ask for an official recommendation to be attached to their passport 
application. Second, it can also levy them indirectly through the PPTKIS. In running its 
operation, the PPTKIS must get approval from the local government. The approval appears 
as a letter of recommendation, such as (i) recommendation to acquire a business license, (ii) 
recommendation to recruit workers, (iii) recommendation to establish a training center, and 
(iv) recommendation to establish a dormitory. Some kabupaten/kota might also impose 
placement fees to the PPTKIS. One should know that charging the PPTKIS means charging 
the migrant workers. In the absence of accountability, the former will simply transfer all the 
costs (and most probably with profit) to the latter. 
 
The majority of perda related to overseas employment are about charges and fees. They are 
formulated rather generally and are not specific about overseas employment. In addition, there 
are also specific perda on overseas employment, which are established by migrant-source 
kabupaten/kota. These are perda without the spirit of extracting levies. On these grounds, we 
offer the typology with two general types of perda: nonspecific (extractive) and specific 
(nonextractive) perda. Specifically, perda related to overseas employment can be grouped into 
four types of perda (Figure 2). 
 
 
aTitle of perda does not specifically mention overseas employment. 
bTitle of perda specifically mentions overseas employment. 
 
Figure 2. Typology of perda related to overseas employment 
Source: Author's framework. 
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Perda on general employment (type 1) focus on charges imposed on general employment, 
including overseas employment.15 These charges are paid either by the workers or by the 
companies. Some kabupaten/kota differentiate perda that charge the workers (perda on employment 
service charges) from perda that charge the companies (perda on licensing charges).16 However, the 
majority of kabupaten/kota just combine them in one category. Type-1 perda are mostly issued by 
migrant-source kabupaten/kota. Possible titles of type-1 perda are perda on employment, perda on 
employment services, and perda on employment charges (see Table A3 of Appendix 1). 
 
Perda on general kabupaten/kota revenues (type 2) relate to possible revenues that the 
kabupaten/kota can generate, including those from overseas employment. They are formulated 
more generally than type-1 perda. Charges in type-2 perda are paid by the citizens and various 
business communities, migrant workers, and the PPTKIS. Possible titles of type-2 perda are 
perda on third party contribution, perda on administration fees, perda on legalization fee, and 
perda on all other revenues (see Table A3 of Appendix 1). 
 
Perda on placement procedure (type 3) deal with overseas employment procedure. It does not 
rule any financial consequences to the migrant workers nor the PPTKIS. Although in some 
cases the title explicitly mentions the protection of migrant workers, the content regulates the 
placement procedure heavily and, therefore, this type is categorized separately from type-4 
perda. Type-3 perda tend to only duplicate the substance of Law No. 39/2004 and, therefore, 
do not fill the policy gap. Indeed, the presence of type-3 perda is rather unnecessary because 
the placement procedure has been regulated nationally. 
 
Perda on protection (type 4) are concerned with the protection of migrant workers. They do 
not entail any charge and concentrate on what have not been ruled in the national law. 
Protection perda mandate the establishment of a protection commission: a specialized body 
which expedites the handling of abuse and extortion cases, mediates between various 
stakeholders, and issues warnings when violations against migrant workers’ rights occur. 
 
Type-1 and type-2 perda intend to secure local revenues. However, since they charge what they 
should not or more than they should, these perda are considered problematic. Certainly, this is in 
violation of the old law (Law No. 34/2000) and even more of the new law (Law No. 28/2009). 
Many of these perda have been cancelled by the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) on the grounds 
that they go against the spirit of local governments to welcome investment.17 
 
However, efforts for the cancellation face enormous difficulties. The standard procedure that 
these perda go through is via an examination by the Ministry of Finance (MoF) from which the 
                                                      
15Perda on general employment might initially intend to protect employees, for example, against work termination, 
violation of minimum wage, etc. However, many of them end up with an extractive nature which is implied in the 
article on cost structure or the article that assures further arrangements on another local regulation. These articles 
are usually placed at the end of the perda. 
16Perda on general employment stipulate charges for various services, such as permit on overtime, registration of 
employment contract, legalization of company rules, facilitation on labor welfare, supervision of work safety, etc. This 
kind of perda always puts protection as the rationale for the charges it imposes. However, the services in return are 
those within the responsibilities of the local government and, therefore, they should be provided free of charge 
(Pambudhi, 2003). 
17Much hope is put in the implementation of the closed-list system under Law No. 28/2009. Since the law 
explicitly stipulates the allowed perda, the local governments, therefore, cannot issue any perda outside the allowed 
ones. 
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problematic perda are submitted for further re-examination by the MoHA.18 Only after the re-
examination can the MoHA finally issue a cancellation letter. 
 
This process is notoriously long and winding due to at least three major factors. First, 
obtaining copies of the perda is not easy since the kabupaten/kota do not send them to Jakarta. 
In fact, the kabupaten/kota tend to hide them.19 In the absence of their copy, the examination 
of perda is impossible. Second, if the total kabupaten/kota amount to 524 kabupaten/kota and 
suppose that one kabupaten/kota produces one perda per month, both the MoF and MoHA 
have to be ready to examine no less than 524 perda per month; a task that is next to 
impossible.20 Third, the financial consequence of investment-related policies might not appear 
directly in the perda but in lower legal products such as bupati decrees, which are very difficult 
to detect from the national level. 
 
Aside from the legal scrutiny of these perda, there is a persistent problem of implementation.  
Even if the minister for home affairs eventually issues a letter ordering the cancellation of the 
perda, the order is not necessarily obeyed by the local authorities. If the local government does 
cancel the perda, it will issue a lower legal product with the same content of the cancelled perda. 
The lower legal product may be in the form of a bupati regulation or decree. The span of 
control of the central government over the existing perda is already very low, let alone over 
lower legal products. 
 
Because of all these difficulties, not surprisingly, the existence of type-1 and type-2 perda is still 
pervasive. The spirit of giving protection to the migrant workers is, therefore, severely 
weakened by the enthusiasm of the local government to levy against the placement of overseas 
employment. 
 
The similarity of type-3 and type-4 perda is that both do not discuss anything about financial 
consequences that the migrant workers or the PPTKIS have to bear. However, their 
difference is that the former focuses more on the placement procedure, while the latter is 
more focused on the protection of migrant workers. This is reflected in the proportion of 
articles and provisions for the placement procedure to those for migrant workers’ protection. 
 
 
3.3 Mapping Analysis 
 
Results of the mapping analysis are explained as follows. First, Table 2 shows that, in 
general, there exists a correlation between kabupaten/kota having perda related to overseas 
employment and kabupaten/kota having a large number of migrant workers. In quintile 1 
(Q1), only 14 out of the 84 kabupaten/kota issued perda related to overseas employment, 
while in Q5, 36 out of the 82 kabupaten/kota issued these perda. This implies that the more 
migrant workers a kabupaten/kota has, the more likely it produces perda related to overseas 
employment. In total, compared to the kabupaten/kota in the other quintiles, kabupaten/kota 
in Q5, which are the migrant-source kabupaten/kota, produced more perda, both in terms of 
quantity and variation. 
                                                      
18With Law No. 28/2009, this task is shifted to the provincial level where the kabupaten government should seek 
consultancy with provincial officials prior to the passing of the perda. 
19This was the experience of the research team in Kabupaten Ponorogo. 
20The Asia Foundation’s study found that in 2002 alone, 635 perda were passed in 40 research areas. This means 
that on average, every kabupaten produces about 16 perda per year (Satriyo et al., 2003). 
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Table 2. Kabupaten/Kota with Perda Related to Overseas Employment: Indicative 
Numbers of Perda and Migrant Workers21 
 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Σ  Kabupaten/Kota = 418a 84 84 84 84 82 
Σ Migrant workers in each 
kabupaten/kota issuing perdab 0−22 36−174 232−802 945−3,534 4,202−57,067 
Σ Kabupaten/kota issuing perda related 
to overseas employment = 115 14 21 20 25
c 35c 
 Σ Kabupaten/kota issuing type-1 perda 12 20 19 23 23 
 Σ Kabupaten/kota issuing type-2 perda 2 1 1 3 11 
 Σ Kabupaten/kota issuing type-3 perda 0 0 0 0 3 
 Σ Kabupaten/kota issuing type-4 perda 0 0 0 0 3 
Σ Perda related to overseas employment 
= 127 16 23 20 28 40 
 Σ Type-1 perda 14 22 19 25 23 
 Σ Type-2 perda 2 1 1 3 11 
 Σ Type-3 perda 0 0 0 0 3 
 Σ Type-4 perda 0 0 0 0 3 
Source: Author’s calculation based on the 2005 Podes and reported perda available on the websites of (i) KPPOD.org; (ii) 
gudanghukum.org; and (iii) legalitas.or.id. 
aThe number of kabupaten/kota is according to the 2005 Podes. 
bData on the number of migrant workers in each kabupaten/kota is taken from the 2005 Podes. 
cSome kabupaten/kota issue more than one perda of the same type, while some others issue more than one perda of 
different types (see Table A3 of Appendix 1). 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Distribution of perda according to their types 
Note: n = number of perda = 127. 
 
 
                                                      
21See Table A3 of Appendix 1 for more detailed information about every perda; Figure A1 of Appendix 2 for the 
distribution of perda based on their legislated years; and Figure A2 of Appendix 2 for the distribution of perda 
based on their corresponding provinces. 
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Second, Figure 3 demonstrates that out of the 127 perda, only 3 perda (2.4%) deal with protection 
(type-4 perda). The majority (81.1%) fall in type-1 perda, while 14.2% belong to type-2 perda. 
Moreover, only 3 kabupaten/kota (3.7%) out of the total 82 migrant-source kabupaten/kota in Q5 
have a protection perda. Meanwhile, 34 kabupaten/kota (41.5%) of the Q5 kabupaten/kota are more 
interested in passing extractive perda. Indeed, the awareness and willingness of the local 
government to take the initiative to protect their migrant workers are still far from adequate. 
 
Third, surprisingly, many kabupaten/kota which have few migrant workers (Q1 to Q3) pass 
type-1 and type-2 perda. The extreme case is that perda related to overseas employment are 
issued even by Q1 kabupaten/kota that do not have any migrant workers, such as Kabupaten 
Berau of East Kalimantan and Kabupaten Murung Raya of Central Kalimantan. These two 
kabupaten are located close to the borders with Malaysia and Brunei and have become migrant 
workers’ transit areas. 
 
 
Figure 4. Distribution of corresponding provinces of kabupaten/kota in Q1 
Note: n = number of kabupaten/kota = 14. 
 
Figure 4 highlights the corresponding provinces of Q1 kabupaten/kota that are well known to 
be transit areas where people from all over Indonesia cross the borders (see also Figure A2 of 
Appendix 2). At the transit areas, prospective migrant workers and the PPTKIS require 
various administrative services from the local government. In addition, undocumented 
migration activities that involve making fake identity documents take place in these areas. 
Considering this potential, the kabupaten/kota governments issue perda to impose charges on 
the migrant workers and PPTKIS. Porous borders of Indonesia to neighboring countries such 
as Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei explain why kabupaten/kota with few migrant workers issue 
perda related to overseas employment. 
 
Domestic migration provides another explanation since type-1 and type-2 perda are also 
applicable to kabupaten/kota with domestic migrant workers. Kabupaten/kota in Kalimantan 
where mining companies are located, such as Kota Bontang and Kabupaten Kutai Timur, are 
areas attracting workers from other parts of Indonesia, particularly Java. Local governments in 
these kabupaten/kota would also be eager to levy domestic migrant workers. That is why type-1 
and type-2 perda tend to spread in the kabupaten/kota regardless of the number of overseas 
migrant workers. 
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Table 3. Kabupaten/Kota with Multiple Perda Related to Overseas Employment 
Kabupaten/Kota Q 
No. of 
Migrant 
Workers 
No./Year Title of Perda Type 
Kota Bontang 1 10 
7/2002 Employment Permit Fee 1 
6/2002 Employment Service Fee 1 
Kabupaten Kutai 
Timur 1 14 
20/2002 Employment Service Fee 1 
18/2002 Skills Development Fund for Migrant Workers 1 
Kabupaten 
Bolaang 
Mangondow 
2 
72 
 
21/2001 Employment Permit Fee 1 
22/2002 Employment Service Fee 1 
Kota Bengkulu 2 124 
5/2003 Employment Permit Fee 1 
6/2003 Employment Service Fee 1 
Kabupaten 
Donggala 4 1,139 
11/2002 Business License of the PPTKIS 1 
12/2002 Employment Recruitment Fee 1 
Kabupaten 
Sukoharjo 4 1,021 
30/2001 Employment Permit Fee 1 
31/2001 Employment Service Fee 1 
Kabupaten Dompu 4 2,802 
16/2001 Employment Service Fee 1 
20/2001 Administration Fees 2 
Kabupaten Bima 5 5,853 
158/2006a Employment Service 1 
25/2001 Administration Fees 2 
Kabupaten Cianjur 5 
49,126 8/2001 Administration Fees 2 
 15/2002 Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 3 
Kabupaten Jember 5 14,469 
12/2003 Employment Fee 1 
5/2008 
Service for, and Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian Migrant 
Workers 
3 
Kabupaten 
Sumbawa 5 8,304 
12/2003 Employment Service Fee 1 
21/2007 Protection and Empowerment of Indonesian Migrant Workers 4 
Kabupaten 
Lombok Barat 5 18,237 
13/2002 Other Legitimate Local Revenues 2 
5/2008 Protection of Indonesian Migrant Workers 4 
Source: Author’s calculation. 
aBupati decree. 
 
Extractive perda which charge migrant workers for administrative services are against 
Presidential Regulation No. 36/2002 on the Ratification of ILO Convention No. 88 on the 
Organization of the Employment Service. In general, Article 6 (b) of the presidential 
regulation instructs the government at all levels to speed up workers’ mobility domestically 
and internationally. In more detail, Article 38 (1) of Law No. 13/2003 on Labor states that 
government institutions as well as the PPTKIS are not to charge any fee to workers directly or 
indirectly. Collecting levies from workers also violates Law No. 28/2009. The local 
government is responsible for providing regular services to the workers free of charge as the 
reflection of its accountability to its citizens. 
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Fourth, the typology that we made is not necessarily mutually exclusive. Table 3 highlights that 
some kabupaten/kota issue more than one perda. Bontang, Kutai Timur, Bolaang Mangondow, 
Bengkulu, Donggala, and Sukoharjo legislated two perda of type 1. Meanwhile, Dompu, Bima, 
Jember, Sumbawa, Cianjur, and Lombok Barat established two perda of different types. What 
is striking is that having the ultimate protection perda does not necessarily mean not having 
extractive perda. Apparently, kabupaten/kota that pass a protection perda do not cancel their 
extractive perda. Sumbawa and Lombok Barat are kabupaten with a protection perda but also 
with extractive and specialized perda. Therefore, the kabupaten/kota may protect their migrant 
workers in some ways but, at the same time, violate the law and tax the workers, directly or 
indirectly. The only mutually exclusive case is Blitar, which only passes a protection perda and 
none of the extractive types. 
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IV. PROTECTION PERDA: TO HAVE OR TO HAVE NOT 
 
 
This chapter answers the last research question posed in this study. In this chapter, 
comparison and contrast are made between perda from Kabupaten Blitar and Kabupaten 
Lombok Barat. And then, textual analysis is conducted on the elaboration of the local 
government’s roles in Law No. 39/2004 and in the perda from Blitar and Lombok Barat. 
Furthermore, discussion is made on the legal drafting process in the four research kabupaten. 
After that, examination is made as to why Blitar and Lombok Barat were successful in the 
process, while Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah which apparently had already had the bill of 
the protection perda failed to legislate it. Emphasis is put particularly on the enabling 
conditions under which the perda could pass the legislation process. 
 
 
4.1 Protection Perda of Kabupaten Blitar and Kabupaten Lombok Barat 
 
4.1.1 Protection Commission 
 
One similarity between the perda from Blitar and Lombok Barat lies in the fact that both 
stipulate the establishment of a protection commission at the kabupatenlkota level.22 The 
formation of this independent body comes from the understanding that the labor and 
transmigration agency will not be able to solve problems alone. Meanwhile, problems at the 
kabupaten/kota level require coordination with many institutions, even including those from 
other kabupaten/kota or provinces. The protection commission is capable of doing this, as it is 
made up of independent professionals with the capacity of expediting solutions and mediating 
disputing parties in the area of overseas employment.23 In general, the establishment of the 
protection commission at the kabupaten/kota level can help solve the abundant cases at the 
migrant-sending kabupaten/kota and villages. 
 
Except for some trivialities, the protection commissions in Blitar and Lombok Barat are 
similar in terms of their establishment and general responsibilities (Table 4). The only 
substantial difference lies in the fact that the protection commission in Blitar was established 
and selected by the parliament. This is due to the fact that the protection perda of Kabupaten 
Blitar was an initiative made by the parliament, while that of Kabupaten Lombok Barat was 
the executive’s initiative. We found during our fieldwork that perda which came from the 
executive’s initiative were much easier to be implemented compared to those coming from the 
legislative’s initiative. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
22In Kabupaten Blitar, the perda was still being revised, and, therefore, the protection commission had not been formed. In 
Kabupaten Lombok Barat, the perda had already come into force and the protection commission was inaugurated in 
October 2010. However, its existence had not been known by many stakeholders interviewed. The lack of socialization of 
the perda had been the concern of many NGO activists such as Rita (PPK official, female, about 50 years old, 21 October 
2010), Susilo (24 October 2010), and Bobby (28 October 2010). 
23Interview with Susilo (24 October 2010). 
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Table 4. Comparison of Protection Commissions in Kabupaten Blitar and 
Kabupaten Lombok Barat 
Kabupaten Blitar (Perda No. 16/2008) Kabupaten Lombok Barat (Perda No. 5/2008) 
Establishment (A. 25): 
Established by the parliament, but authorized by the 
bupati; consisting of five people (NGO activists, local 
leaders, professionals); to be selected through a fit-
and-proper test by the parliament; working for three 
years with a possibility to be re-elected once more; to 
be appointed and terminated with a bupati decree 
Establishment (A. 20): 
Established by the bupati after being selected by a 
team consisting of five people (academics, migrant 
workers’ association members, local government 
officials, members of the parliament, NGO activists); 
consisting of five people; working for five years with 
a possibility to be re-elected once more  
Responsibilities (A. 26): 
To receive complaints related to violations of the 
recruitment and placement procedure; to establish 
regulations, complaint-handling mechanism; to 
conduct mediations; to manage a “safe shelter”; to 
campaign for the migrant workers’ rights and 
obligations; to coordinate with relevant institutions  
Responsibilities (A. 23): 
To receive complaints; to collect and analyze data 
related to complaints; to push the labor and 
transmigration agency, relevant agencies, and the 
PPTKIS to solve cases of the migrant workers; to 
mediate parties in dispute; to coordinate with 
relevant institutions from other kabupaten or 
provinces 
Authorities (A. 24): 
To request info regarding migrant workers’ cases 
from the PPTKIS and responsible officials; to invite 
parties for consultation and mediation 
Reporting (A. 26): 
To report to the bupati annually 
Reporting (A. 25): 
To report to the bupati biannually 
Source: Perda No. 16/2008 of Kabupaten Blitar and Perda No. 5/2008 of Kabupaten Lombok Barat. 
Note: A. = Article. 
 
 
4.1.2 Roles and Responsibilities of the Local Government 
 
Table 5 compares the local government’s roles and responsibilities as attributed by Law No. 
39/2004 and those stipulated by the perda of Kabupaten Blitar and Kabupaten Lombok Barat. 
 
Some important lessons that arise from this exercise are as follows. First, it is clear from the 
table that the stipulations in the perda strengthen the mandate of Law No. 39/2004 and, 
therefore, give more protection to the workers. This is particularly true in the case of 
registration, placement contract between the PPTKIS and the migrant workers, and 
supervision. The perda from Blitar and Lombok Barat are stronger in assigning the labor and 
transmigration agency to check the validity of ID documents. Similarly, the roles and 
responsibilities of the labor and transmigration agency are also stronger in the area of 
placement contract. Blitar’s perda requires the labor and transmigration agency to be present 
during the signing of a placement contract, to get a copy of it, and to ensure that each worker 
signs the contract within six days after it passes the selection process. In addition, the 
supervisory roles of the labor and transmigration agency are made clearer in the perda of both 
kabupaten than in Law No. 39/2004. 
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Table 5. Comparing the Roles & Responsibilities of the Local Government in Law 
No. 39/2004 and Those in Two Perda 
Roles and 
Responsibilities Law No. 39/2004 
Kabupaten Blitar 
Perda (Perda No. 
16/2008) 
Kabupaten Lombok 
Barat Perda (Perda No. 
5/2008) 
Registration To register prospective 
migrant workers (A. 36) 
To check validity of ID 
documents (A. 23) 
To check the validity of ID 
documents (A. 12) 
Placement contract The labor and transmigration 
agency should be informed of 
the placement contract (A. 38). 
The PPTKIS should send a 
copy of it to the labor and 
transmigration agency (A. 51). 
To be signed in front 
of a labor and 
transmigration agency 
officer (A. 11) 
To get a copy of it (A. 16)
To ensure that each 
worker signs the 
contract within six 
days after passing the 
selection process      
(A. 12) 
To check the validity of the 
placement contract  
(A. 12) 
Recommendation for 
passport application 
To give a recommendation 
letter (Explanation of A. 51) 
--- --- 
Supervision  To supervise the 
implementation of the 
placement and protection of 
migrant workers (A. 92) 
The labor and 
transmigration agency 
is to appoint one or 
two officers to 
supervise the PPTKIS 
(A. 22). 
The labor and 
transmigration agency has 
to supervise the existence 
and operation of the 
PPTKIS. The labor and 
transmigration agency has 
to get a biannual report from 
the PPTKIS (A. 19). 
Supervisory 
mechanism 
The labor and transmigration 
agency reports the supervision 
of the placement and 
protection of migrant workers 
to the minister (A. 93). 
--- The kabupaten’s labor and 
transmigration agency is to 
report to the provincial 
labor and transmigration 
agency and the minister 
for labor in case of a 
violation by the PPTKIS 
(A. 19). 
Mediation in case of a 
dispute  
The labor and transmigration 
agency can help mediate the 
dispute (A. 85). 
The labor and 
transmigration agency 
is to be invited to 
mediate the dispute 
(A. 32). 
The labor and 
transmigration 
agency/protection 
commission receives 
cases and must follow 
them up within 10 x 24 
hours (A. 27, A. 28). 
Investigation in case 
of a legal offense 
The selected officials at the 
labor and transmigration 
agency are given authority to 
act as special investigators  
(A. 101). 
 
Appointed local 
government officials 
are given the authority 
to investigate 
violations against the 
perda (A. 35). 
--- 
Other roles and 
responsibilities 
--- Protection commission 
(A. 25–A. 28) 
Safe shelter (A. 26) 
Protection fund (A. 29) 
Protection commission  
(A. 20–A. 25) 
Soft loan (A. 6) 
Rehabilitation for victims of 
abuse and trafficking (A. 7) 
Crisis center (A. 26) 
Source: Law No. 39/2004; Perda No. 16/2008 of Kabupaten Blitar; and Perda No. 5/2008 of Kabupaten Lombok Barat. 
Note: A. = Article. 
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Second, a general weakness in the establishment of a law is that the implementing legislation 
comes much later.24 In the case of Law No. 39/2004, which was issued in 2004, its implementing 
legislation, namely Permenakertrans No. PER.19/MEN/V/2006, was only delivered two years 
afterwards. There was a two-year vacuum where Kepmenakertrans25 No. KEP.104A/MEN/2002 
was still used. Furthermore, the socialization of the implementing legislation was also problematic. 
Not uncommon, a time lag exists between the establishment of a permenakertrans or kepmenakertrans 
and the local government being informed of it.26 In other words, the establishment of the 
implementing legislation itself is already slow and its socialization is even slower. Protection perda, 
which have the intention of giving protection to the migrant workers, have the potential to fill this 
policy gap. One extreme case is in the local government’s responsibility in terms of supervision 
and supervisory mechanism whose implementation legislation is still nonexistence. In this instance, 
Kabupaten Lombok Barat’s perda managed to stipulate it, although only in a general way. 
 
Third, even if the implementing legislation does exist, it might not be sufficiently specific. In 
many cases, it simply copies and pastes what is written in the law (Table 6). In other words, 
the implementing legislation fails to deliver the details as well, except for Permenakertrans No. 
PER.14/MEN/X/2010, which explicitly exempts the migrant workers from any charge. 
Compared to the law and regulations at the national level, the perda of Kabupaten Blitar and 
Kabupaten Lombok Barat offer even more details in specifying the local government’s roles 
and responsibilities. 
 
Fourth, local initiatives, such as the protection fund in Blitar and the soft loan, rehabilitation, 
and crisis centers in Lombok Barat, have to be appreciated. Although they are not immediately 
available, the policy process has touched some important areas which were previously never 
addressed in any legal framework at the national level. 
 
 
4.2 The Legal Drafting Process of Perda in the Research Kabupaten 
 
4.2.1 Kabupaten Blitar 
 
The perda of Kabupaten Blitar that governs migrant workers went through a long process. 
The initiative started in 2003 when some NGOs, with the support of UNIFEM, raised the 
idea of formally protecting migrant workers from Blitar through a perda. The two main 
NGOs were Blitar Migrant Workers’ Association (SBMB) and Association for the Care of 
Women and Migrant Workers (P3BM). Other NGOs involved were the Post Institute, 
Lapesdam NU, and Sitas Desa. 
 
The process was interrupted for some time due to the 2004 national elections and the 
kabupaten election in 2005. In 2006, the parliament, in particular Commission IV in charge of 
labor, agreed to embrace this idea and intensified the legal drafting process. 
                                                      
24Most of the time, laws only stipulate normative terms and, therefore, they require the implementing legislation, 
such as permenakertrans and kepmenakertrans, which becomes the technical guidance for implementation. However, 
the problem of slow establishment of the implementing legislation happens to all laws, not in particular to Law 
No. 39/2004. 
25Labor and Transmigration Ministerial Decree. 
26When the research team visited Kabupaten Ponorogo’s Labor and Transmigration Agency in June 2010 and asked 
what kind of regulation was used in the placement and protection of migrant workers, the officer replied 
Kepmenakertrans No. KEP.104A/MEN/2002. Meanwhile, the research team also found that Kabupaten Blitar’s 
Labor and Transmigration Agency issued a circular to all village heads dated 2 June 2009 in which it referred to Law 
No. 39/2004 and Kepmenakertrans No. KEP.104A/MEN/2002. 
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Table 6. Specific Roles and Responsibilities of the Local Government Where Law 
No. 39/2004 Promised to Issue the Implementing Legislation 
Law  
No. 39/2004 
Implementing Legislation 
Permenakertrans 
No. 
PER.19/MEN/V/2006 
Permenakertrans  
No. 
PER.18/MEN/IX/2007 
Permenakertrans 
No. 
ER.14/MEN/X/2010 
Registration (A. 36): 
(1) Job seekers wishing to work 
overseas have to register in the 
relevant government agency at the 
kabupaten level (A. 36 (1)). 
(2) The registration as mentioned 
above is done according to the 
permenakertrans. 
Both the staffs of the 
PPTKIS and the 
labor and 
transmigration 
agency disseminate 
information to 
prospective migrant 
workers who have 
registered at the 
labor and 
transmigration 
agency (A. 8). 
Both the staffs of the 
PPTKIS and the labor 
and transmigration 
agency disseminate 
information to 
prospective migrant 
workers who have 
registered at the labor 
and transmigration 
agency (A. 9). 
Job seekers wishing 
to work overseas 
have to register at 
the kabupaten-level 
agency without 
being charged any 
fee (A. 8). 
Supervision (A. 92): 
(1) The supervision against the 
implementation of the placement and 
protection of migrant workers is carried 
out by the government agency in 
charge of employment at the central, 
provincial, and kabupaten/kota levels. 
(2) The implementation of the 
supervision mentioned above will be 
further stipulated by a government 
regulation.a  
--- --- --- 
Supervision report (A. 93): 
(1) The government agency in charge 
of employment at the central, 
provincial, and kabupaten/kota levels 
must report the implementation of the 
supervision within their jurisdiction to 
the minister. 
(2) The mechanism for reporting as 
mentioned above will be further 
stipulated in the permenakertrans. 
--- --- --- 
Source: Law No. 39/2004; Permenakertrans No. PER.19/MEN/V/2006; Permenakertrans No. PER.18/MEN/IX/2006; 
Permenakertrans No. PER.14/MEN/X/2010. 
Note: A. = Article. 
aNo government regulation has been issued since then. 
 
In early 2008, the Blitar parliament agreed to include the raperda (perda bill) on migrant workers 
into the local legislation program (prolegda). Entering the 2008 Prolegda meant that the raperda 
would be discussed by the parliament and had to be legislated by 2008. A special committee 
was then formed to thoroughly discuss the raperda submitted by the NGOs. After several 
meetings with various stakeholders, the parliament approved the perda on 17 December 2008. 
The day after, on the International Migrant Day, which was on 18 December 2008, the bupati 
signed Perda No. 16/2008 on the Protection of Kabupaten Blitar’s Migrant Workers in 
Foreign Countries. 
 
After the signing and numbering of the perda, the legislating process should have been 
continued with the recording of the perda in the kabupaten legislation book. However, this was 
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not done by the kabupaten secretary.27 Consequently, the perda could not be enforced. This 
certainly was ironic because in August 2009, the Blitar parliament won the autonomy award 
from the Jawa Post Institute of Pro-Otonomi (JPIP). The Institute regarded the Blitar 
parliament as having good initiatives in passing perda on the protection of migrant workers. 
 
The reluctance to fully legislate the perda roots back to the fact that the perda came from the 
parliament’s initiative. The executive, in this case the head of the Labor and Transmigration 
Agency, somehow felt excluded in the discussion (interview with several Labor and 
Transmigration Agency officials). An NGO activist that was interviewed denied this complaint. 
He said that the kabupaten agency was always invited to the meetings. This problem occurred 
because during the policy process, which took place from 2003 to 2008, the head of the Labor and 
Transmigration Agency changed several times. As a result, the successors felt left out of the process 
(interview with Tukimin, an SBMB activist, male, about 40 years old, 21 June 2010). 
 
Box 2 
The Pamphlet of Kabupaten Blitar’s Labor and Transmigration Agency 
 
Kabupaten Blitar’s Labor and Transmigration Agency has taken the dissemination of information to migrant 
workers seriously.a In 2009, the Labor and Transmigration Agency had printed pamphlets that specifically 
alerted migrant workers to some unscrupulous practices of the intermediaries or irresponsible PPTKIS and 
recommended some steps to avoid them. First, the migrant workers were advised to check the legality of the 
PPTKIS: whether it has a valid job order, valid recommendation issued by the Technical Working Unit of 
Placement and Protection Service for Indonesian Migrant Workers (UPT P3TKI), and valid registration at the 
Labor and Transmigration Agency. Second, they were advised to check the ID card of the field staff of the 
PPTKIS. Third, they were advised not to pay any money until the departure was firm. They can consult the 
Labor and Transmigration Agency regarding the payment. Fourth, they were advised to get a confirmation 
letter of the documents they had submitted from the PPTKIS. Finally, working overseas is only allowed for 
those registered at the Labor and Transmigration Agency and for those above 21 years of age wishing to work 
as overseas domestic helpers. 
 
In the pamphlet, the Labor and Transmigration Agency also warned the migrant workers about the danger of 
trusting intermediaries, who brought about countless cases of deception and fraud. Specifically, if Japan and Korea 
are the destination countries, the migrant workers have to understand that the placement is only carried out through 
the central government, not the PPTKIS. The placement for Japan is carried out through an apprentice program and 
mainly targets men who have gone through a very tough selection process. In addition, only female nurses passing 
diploma and undergraduate courses are eligible to work in Japan. Prospective migrant workers without these 
qualifications should not have any false hope due to false promises made by intermediaries. The Labor and 
Transmigration Agency further informed the migrant workers that the PPTKIS in charge of Korea is the one 
appointed by the central government and only those who have passed a Korean language test are eligible. 
 
The Labor and Transmigration Agency encourages the migrant workers to look for more information by: 
a) visiting http://blitarkab.go.id; 
b)  sending an email to disnakertrans_kabblitar@yahoo.go.id;b 
c) visiting the Labor and Transmigration Agency at Jl. Imam Bonjol No. 7; or 
d) calling the Labor and Transmigration Agency at 0342-8001407. 
 
Source: Kabupaten Blitar’s Labor and Transmigration Agency, 2009. 
aIn the four research areas, only Blitar was observed to distribute pamphlets. 
bIt might mean disnakertrans_kabblitar@yahoo.co.id. 
 
Furthermore, the Labor and Transmigration Agency at the kabupaten level argued that the perda 
had some substantial flaws. This was corroborated by the official letter of the Governor of 
                                                      
27He was the one who gave the number to the perda, but, ironically, he refused to include the perda in the 
kabupaten legislation book. 
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East Java following their assessment of the substance of Blitar’s perda.28 The letter 
recommended that the title of the perda be changed by taking into account the substance of 
the perda, mostly covering protection commission. Therefore, in their opinion, the proper title 
of the perda should have been “Protection Commission”. 
 
Following the provincial assessment, legal analysis was also carried out at the kabupaten level. 
Widiarto (2010) presented some findings against the perda. First, the title of the perda was 
considered incorrect. The perda titled “Protection of Kabupaten Blitar’s Migrant Workers in the 
Foreign Countries” implies that the local government has the power to deal with foreign countries, 
which is against its jurisdiction. This implication is also clear in Article 22 (1) of the perda, which 
requires the Labor and Transmigration Agency to supervise Blitar migrant workers working 
overseas, a task that cannot be performed by the agency. Second, the provisions on the protection 
commission have not been integrated with the rest of the provisions in the perda. On the contrary, 
it has raised new provisions on the existence of shelters for migrant workers. Third, there exists a 
contradiction in the party being in charge of protection. Article 27 (1) stipulates that the protection 
commission is in charge of protection, while Article 14 (1) states that the PPTKIS is the one that is 
responsible for the protection of migrant workers. Fourth, some provisions, such as those on class 
action, should have been ruled by a law and not by the perda. 
 
At present, the parliament is trying to revise the perda based on the assessment of the 
provincial Labor and Transmigration Agency. NGO activists are supporting this process, but 
since the financial support from UNIFEM has ended, it has to use its own limited resources. 
 
4.2.2 Kabupaten Lombok Barat29 
 
In 2006, local NGOs—Koslata and the Association of Five Ideas (PPK)—were committed to 
assisting the local government to proceed with the protection perda. Funding for this initiative 
came from the European Union and Yayasan TIFA. The legal drafting process was done through 
a series of discussions at different levels. At the village level, PPK held discussions with 
prospective and former migrant workers, and their families, and relevant stakeholders at the village 
level. Five migrant-source villages were picked out purposively, each conducted ten thematic 
discussions where problems were mapped and clustered, and their solutions were formulated. 
 
At the kabupaten and provincial levels, ten discussions were also held to follow up the findings 
at the village level. The discussions involved various stakeholders and the legal drafting team 
consisting of (i) Koslata and PPK, (ii) the Legal Department of the Bupati Office, (iii) head of 
the Labor and Transmigration Agency, and (iv) academics. The inclusion of these stakeholders 
was to ensure their sense of ownership. Finally, a public consultation was conducted with 
various PPTKIS before the public hearing with the local parliament. Lobbying the local 
parliament members was very important to convince them to finally agree with the raperda. 
 
The perda was legislated on 14 March 2008. However, the implementation of the perda was 
hampered by the kabupaten executive election and then the national elections. Following the 
kabupaten executive election, the administration was reshaped. Unfortunately, the selected head 
of the Labor and Transmigration Agency was a former camat (subdistrict head) who knew 
nothing about employment, let alone migrant workers. This worsened the implementation of 
the perda. 
                                                      
28Letter from the provincial secretary on behalf of the Governor of East Java No. 188/11173/013/2009 dated 31 
July 2009 on the Assessment of Blitar’s Perda No. 16/2008. 
29Interviews with Susilo (24 October 2010) and Rita (21 October 2010). 
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4.2.3 Kabupaten Ponorogo 
 
From 2005 to 2006, Plan International, together with Social Protection Labor Network 
(JKPS) Cahaya, a local NGO, took the initiative to draft a protection perda.30 The overall 
process of legal drafting brought together some NGOs, local government officials, parliament 
members, and academics. 
 
In 2006, the perda had come to its fourth revision. An official of the Office of Women’s 
Empowerment and Child Protection (KP3A) explained that the cost had reached no less than 
Rp100 million, yet JKPS Cahaya failed to convince the Labor and Transmigration Agency as well 
as the local parliament to agree with the draft.31 JKPS Cahaya held several demonstrations to push 
the local government to react. However, the Labor and Transmigration Agency did not give any 
support to follow this up to the local parliament. At the same time, the local parliament was not 
interested in the substance of the perda. Therefore, the raperda was left unused until now. 
 
 
4.2.4 Kabupaten Lombok Tengah 
 
In Kabupaten Lombok Tengah, the preparation for the legal drafting began in 2004 when 
PPK, a local NGO, approached the Labor and Transmigration Agency to formulate the 
protection perda. Funding from this initiative came from TIFA Foundation. 
 
From 2005 to 2006, the discussion was intensified until the raperda reached its final version. 
However, the bill was rejected by the local parliament.32 One important reason for the 
rejection was that the substance of the perda was duplicating Law No. 39/2004 and, therefore, 
it would be of no urgent use.33 
 
 
4.3 Comparing the Outcomes and Enabling Conditions in the Four 
Kabupaten 
 
4.3.1 Local Initiatives to Pass Protection Perda 
 
To retrieve information from the four visited kabupaten, Table 7 was constructed. Some 
important highlights of the table are as follows. First, the duration of the policy process that is 
too short, such as one year in the case of Ponorogo, is certainly insufficient to advocate the 
protection perda. However, if it is too long, the policy process will encounter very frequent 
transfers of government staff which can significantly delay the success of the policy process 
and demotivate the stakeholders. This is the case with Blitar where the successors were not 
familiar with the passed stages of the policy process. 
                                                      
30Interviews with staff from PUSAR: Rizki (male, about 30 years old, 30 June 2010) and Rian (male, about 25 years old, 
30 June 2010). The interview with JKPS Cahaya could not be carried out, as its office had moved out of Ponorogo. 
Even worse, Rizki said that JKPS Cahaya had closed its operation. Nevertheless, one of its former staff was invited 
(through PUSAR) to an FGD at the kabupaten level, but he left the discussion afterwards for an unknown reason. 
31Interview with Ani, an official of KP3A of Kabupaten Ponorogo (female, about 30 years old, 28 June 2010). 
32There are two versions of stories about who rejected the draft. According to an interview with Jainal (male, about 40 
years old, 29 October 2010), an official of the Legal Department of the Bupati Office of Lombok Tengah, the local 
parliament was the one that rejected the law. However, according to an interview with Yudha, an official of Kabupaten 
Lombok Tengah’s Labor and Transmigration Agency (male, about 50 years old, 29 October 2010), it was the executive who 
disagreed with the idea of having a protection perda. He said that he was one of the team members that criticized the raperda. 
33This information came from Yudha (29 October 2010). 
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Second, the raperda of Kabupaten Ponorogo and Kabupaten Lombok Tengah that we 
reviewed reveal that they both fall into type-3 perda of our typology. In other words, both 
regulate the placement rather than the protection of migrant workers. Since the raperda was 
similar to Law No. 39/2004, the executive and legislative bodies in these two kabupaten were 
not interested in and did not show commitment to passing them.34 
 
Third, Kabupaten Blitar’s perda is the only local initiative which comes from the legislative 
side. Interviews with local parliament members disclosed that their involvement started 
only in 2006, three years after the onset of the protection perda project.35 Engagement with 
the local parliament was a smart solution, as the local government did not seem to agree 
with the protection perda in the first place. Unfortunately, even after the approval from the 
parliament, the perda could not be enforced, as it was not recorded in the kabupaten 
legislation book. 
 
Table 7. General Information on Local Initiatives to Pass Protection Perda 
 Blitar Lombok Barat Ponorogo Lombok Tengah 
Donor agency UNIFEM European Union, 
and Yayasan TIFA 
Plan International Yayasan TIFA 
Advocating NGOs SBMB, P3BM Yayasan Koslata, 
PPK 
JKPS Cahaya PPK 
Establishment of 
NGO 
SBMB in 2002 
 
Yayasan Koslata in 
1989, 
PPK in 1988 
Unknown, but 
dissolved in 2009  
PPK in 1988 
Duration of policy 
process 
2003–2008 2006–2008 2005–2006 2004–2006 
Legal drafting 
process 
2007–2008 2006–2007 2005–2006 2005–2006 
Prolegda 2008 2007 Failed to be 
included in the 
2007 Prolegda. 
Rejected by both 
the executive and 
legislative bodies 
Failed to be 
included in the 
2006 Prolegda. 
Rejected by both 
the executive and 
legislative bodies 
Legislation date of 
perda  
18 December 
2008a 
 
14 March 2008 --- --- 
Initiator of perda Legislative’s 
initiative 
Executive’s 
initiative 
Supposed to be the 
executive’s 
initiative 
Supposed to be the 
executive’s 
initiative 
Substance of 
perdab 
Protection Protection Placement Placement 
aThis was the date when the bupati signed the perda. 
bAuthor’s review. 
 
                                                      
34This information came from an interview with Yudha (29 October 2010). The same reason was also mentioned by staff 
members of Kabupaten Blitar’s Labor and Transmigration Agency, namely Kadir (male, about 50 years old, 21 June 2010), 
Iwan (male, about 40 years old, 21 June 2010), and Bambang (male, about 40 years old, 21 June 2010), who rejected the 
protection perda. However, the statement “the perda is just copied and pasted from Law No. 39/2004” needs further 
verification. 
35Interviews with local parliament members: Slamet (male, about 40 years old, 22 June 2010) and Titik (female, 
about 40 years old, 22 June 2010). 
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4.3.2 Internal Factors 
 
Table 8 compares four main stakeholders during the policy process: the local government, 
local parliament, advocating NGOs, and the PPTKIS. The role of the local government, 
comprising the Labor and Transmigration Agency, Legal Department of the Bupati Office, 
kabupaten secretary, and head of the Local Development Planning Agency (Bappeda), is 
particularly important during the process, as it is the implementer of the perda.36 Therefore, the 
capacity of NGOs to convince them to join the policy process is very important.37 On the 
other hand, it is also crucial to get the parliament members’ approval of the raperda, to bring 
the raperda into the prolegda, and to legislate it. 
 
Table 8. General Information on Internal Factors: Stakeholders’ Perception 
 Blitar Lombok Barat Ponorogo Lombok Tengah 
Commitment of the 
local government 
Low High Low Low 
Commitment of the 
local parliament 
High Moderate Low Low 
Capacity of the 
advocating NGOs  
Good capacity to 
formulate legal 
drafting. Capacity to 
lobby the executive 
body is not sufficient. 
Good capacity to 
formulate legal 
drafting. Good 
capacity to lobby 
the executive and 
legislative bodies. 
Not known Good 
Trust, relationship, 
and interaction 
Distrust, low 
interaction, in 
particular between 
the NGO and Labor 
and Transmigration 
Agency. Good 
relationship between 
the NGO and 
parliament members 
Trust, intensive 
interaction 
NGO not well 
known to 
stakeholders in 
Ponorogo. Low 
interaction 
between the NGO 
and other 
stakeholders 
Trust but not 
intensive 
interaction 
Position of the 
advocating NGOs 
Contestation Engagement Contestationa Engagement 
Physical distance 
between the NGO 
and the other 
stakeholders 
Close Close Far Far 
Intervention from 
the PPTKIS 
High Unaware Some members of 
the parliament 
own the PPTKIS 
Unaware 
aJKPS Cahaya held demonstrations several times, according to staff members of the Center for the Study of Advocacy for 
the People (PUSAR), namely Rizki (30 June 2010) and Rian (30 June 2010). 
 
                                                      
36These officials were included in the legal drafting team. 
37The policy process in Kabupaten Lombok Barat was more systematic. Both Koslata and PPK were the “old 
players” in the development industry in NTB. Koslata is well known to have the capacity as an advocating NGO 
which has partnerships not only with the executive body but also with the legislative body, and not only at the 
kabupaten level but also at the provincial level. Therefore, resistance of their partners was minimal. In the case of 
Kabupaten Lombok Barat, the process of advocacy at the kabupaten level was done by Koslata, whereas the 
process of collecting aspiration from the village level was done by PPK, which has the capacity as a community 
empowerment NGO. 
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In the policy process, commitment is a must. Koslata and PPK, in particular, chose 
Lombok Barat to advocate the protection perda because they were certain that the 
Kabupaten Government of Lombok Barat had high commitment to protecting the migrant 
workers.38 The commitment of the local government as well as the local parliament does 
not, however, stand on its own. It depends on the substance of the raperda, such as the 
case of Lombok Tengah, and also on the NGOs’ understanding of the substance as well as 
their technical capacity to lobby and convince both the local government and the 
parliament to pass the perda. 
 
On the other hand, low commitment can also arise from a lack of willingness to protect 
migrant workers and a lack of awareness of gender issues among policymakers and 
bureaucrats.39 Overseas migration involves social costs such as weaker family cohesion and 
increased divorce rate and juvenile cases that are borne by individuals, families, and the society 
in general; thus, linking gender with overseas migration. Moreover, with the majority of 
Indonesian migrant workers being women, they tend to be blamed for the emergence of these 
costs.40 Because local governments and parliaments lack awareness of these gender issues, 
passing a protection perda can help minimize the aforementioned costs. 
 
At the same time, this already low commitment is made worse by the general mindset of the local 
government that the placement and protection of migrant workers is the task of the central, and 
not the local, government. For example, an official interviewed believed that the local government 
at the time being could not arbitrarily establish the perda without the approval of the central and 
provincial governments.41 In the case of Lombok Tengah, an informant from the Labor and 
Transmigration Agency was concerned that the perda would disturb the migration outflow, which 
could further cause a high unemployment rate at the kabupaten level.42 The other informants said 
that the local government would not be able to protect the migrant workers in the destination 
countries, as it fell beyond its jurisdiction.43 In addition, many fear the insufficient budget and 
capacity to carry out the mandate of the perda.44 In Lombok Barat, an informant from PPK was 
concerned that the local budget (APBD) would not be able to accommodate an increase in budget 
due to the increase in roles and responsibilities.45 In all the visited kabupaten, it was observed that 
the Labor and Transmigration Agency appeared to have only a limited budget, which could be the 
main reason for its low commitment and the reason to maintain status quo. 
 
Furthermore, the position that the advocating NGOs take in their relation with local counterparts 
is important. In particular, this relationship must not end once the perda is legislated. Instead, it 
should remain during the implementation of the perda. SBMB and P3BM tend to take a 
                                                      
38Interview with Susilo (24 October 2010). 
39Interview with Ani (28 June 2010). 
40Interview with Ahmad, an official of the Religious Court of Kabupaten Blitar (male, about 50 years old, 22 June 
2010). 
41Interview with Gatot, an officer of the Legal Department of the Bupati Office of Kabupaten Ponorogo (male, 
about 50 years old, 28 June 2010); Kadir (21 June 2010), Iwan (21 June 2010), and Bambang (21 June 2010). 
42Interview with Yudha (29 October 2010). 
43Interviews with Jainal (29 October 2010), Kadir (21 June 2010), Iwan (21 June 2010), and Bambang (21 June 
2010). 
44Interview with Dedi, an official of the Bappeda of Kabupaten Ponorogo (male, about 50 years old, 28 June 2010). 
45In 2010, the budget of the protection commission came from the Revised APBD, the sustainability of which 
was in question. 
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contestation (contesting) position, i.e., to push from the outside, while NGOs in NTB are likely to 
engage and work together with local partners. We observe that in East Java, frictions between 
NGOs and the local government are still apparent. In NTB, particularly in Lombok Barat, the 
local government is quite open to NGO participation in policymaking thanks to the development 
of trust over some decades.46 Trust is, therefore, vital to the success of perda legislation. 
 
Additionally, the physical distance between the advocating NGOs and the local counterparts is 
another factor that influences the interaction of both parties. In the case of Lombok Tengah, 
PPK is located in Mataram, about two hours of travel from Praya, the capital city of Lombok 
Tengah. On the contrary, in the case of Lombok Barat and Blitar, the stakeholders are 
physically close to each other. 
 
Box 3 
In Search of Justice: the Dilemma of Litigation 
 
Effective and good governance is measured by, among other things, the extent to which the law is 
enforceable. Overseas employment has been well known to apply lenient sanctions against violators of the 
law. This is in line with the spirit of Law No. 39/2004. Article 85 of the law stipulates that in disputes between 
the migrant workers and the PPTKIS, both should prioritize finding a peaceful solution. In addition, one or both 
parties should seek support from the central, provincial, or local Labor and Transmigration Agency. The law 
says nothing about using legal action to proceed. Because of this, mediation has been the approach taken 
towards cases and complaints of the migrant workers. 
 
At the same time, litigation does not serve as a plausible alternative either. Adding to the workers’ plight is the 
long and winding road of a lawsuit. It certainly squeezes money out of them, let alone energy and time. Again, 
Law No. 39/2004 has been blamed as the cause of the lengthy process of litigation. Articles 21 and 23 of the 
law stipulate that the headquarters will be the one in charge of any misdeed committed by its branches. Since 
90% of the PPTKIS are registered in Jakarta, the victims have to start the legal case from their village and 
chase the PPTKIS to Jakarta. The provisions in the law and the fact that 90% of the PPTKIS are in Jakarta 
have made the supervision of the PPTKIS by the local government extremely difficult. On the other hand, the 
PPTKIS would definitely choose to locate themselves as far as possible from the migrant-sending 
kabupaten/kota and villages and, therefore, as far as possible from whatever abuses their branches have 
committed. 
 
Furthermore, completing the legal documents is always a drawn-out process, although this is not typically the 
case for overseas employment cases. Normally, the document completion process takes two years before it 
gets approval to start the trial. In most cases, the documents submitted are rejected twice or even more before 
it gets approval. Yet, the onset of court cases can be terminated simply because the accused flees overseas. 
Also, in a case that involves below-age migrant workers, the police rarely execute the trafficking law whose 
punishment could triple common crime cases, such as kidnapping. Therefore, even if the court eventually 
incriminates the violator, the charge would be soft. For many migrant workers and their families, the time, 
energy, and money put into seeking justice in this way is just not worth it. 
 
There are other reasons why most workers choose to just drop their case. First is because their relatives are 
part of the charge. For example, the parents brought a case of child trafficking to the courts only to learn later 
that the uncle was involved in the case. Second, many would draw themselves out after being given financial 
compensation from the PPTKIS. For many victims, getting compensation might be better than risking the 
uncertainty of legal action. 
 
Source: Interview with Bobby (28 October 2010). 
 
The involvement of the PPTKIS is another issue to consider. The advocating NGOs in 
Lombok Barat deliberately excluded the PPTKIS from the policy process. The reason was 
straightforward: Almost all the PPTKIS were profit-oriented and would only hamper the 
                                                      
46The history of NGO movement in NTB dates back to 1982 (Dahlan, 2000), which is much earlier than the 
NGO movement in East Java. 
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overall process. Koslata and PPK unanimously agreed to exclude them in the legal drafting. 
The PPTKIS were only invited to the public consultation at the end of the process.47 Because 
of this, the PPTKIS were not aware of the perda in Kabupaten Lombok Barat.48 In Ponorogo, 
the intervention of the PPTKIS was serious. In 2006, the raperda was submitted to be included 
in the 2007 Prolegda. Many of the parliament members who were known to own a PPTKIS 
and to have relatives owning PPTKIS rejected the raperda.49 In Blitar, the PPTKIS were against 
the discussion of the raperda in the parliament (The Institute for Ecosoc Rights and Trade 
Union Rights Center, 2008b). They threatened to move out of Blitar if the raperda was passed. 
 
However, compared to Kabupaten Lombok Barat, the perda of Kabupaten Blitar stipulates 
more demanding roles and responsibilities of the PPTKIS (Table 9). Therefore, their 
resistance in Blitar is stronger than in Lombok Barat. 
 
Table 9. Roles and Responsibilities of the PPTKIS in Kabupaten Blitar and 
Kabupaten Lombok Barat 
Kabupaten Blitar  (Perda No. 16/2008) Kabupaten Lombok Barat (Perda No. 5/2008) 
To recruit and select the workers; to disseminate 
information about the work, requirements, and 
obligation of the workers (A. 6) 
To provide shelter during training; to own a training 
center to improve skills and language; to compensate 
the workers in case of departure cancellation (A. 13) 
To monitor and protect workers in the destination 
country; to take care of sick or deceased workers; to 
organize the return of the workers  (A. 14) 
To establish a branch office in NTB; to establish a 
service office in Lombok Barat (A. 4) 
To appoint field officers (either staff or nonstaff); to 
equip the field officers with an ID card legalized by 
the kabupaten Labor and Transmigration Agency (A. 
5) 
To submit a written report on the progress of migrant 
workers in the destination countries biannually (A. 16) 
 
Source: Perda No. 16/2008 of Kabupaten Blitar; Perda No. 5/2008 of Kabupaten Lombok Barat. 
Note: A. = Article. 
 
4.3.3 External Factors 
 
External factors are factors that are beyond the control of the stakeholders, including 
election time, transfer of government staff, finance from donor agencies, and other 
incentives (Table 10).  
                                                      
47Interview with Susilo (24 October 2010). 
48Interviews with the PPTKIS staff in Kabupaten Lombok Barat, namely Didi (male, about 30 years old, 21 
October 2010), Lusi (female, about 50 years old, 22 October 2010), and Sapto (male, about 40 years old, 26 
October 2010). 
49Interview with Ani (28 June 2010). 
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Table 10. General Information on External Factors: Stakeholders’ Perception 
 Blitar Lombok Barat Ponorogo Lombok Tengah 
Timing  of the 
legislative election 
5 April 2004 
6 March 2009 
5 April 2004 
6 March 2009 
5 April 2004 
6 March 2009 
5 April 2004 
6 March 2009 
Timing  of the 
executive election 
27 November 
2005 
9 November 2010 
20 October 2005 
30 October 2008 
(first round) 
15 December 2008 
(second round) 
20 June 2005 
3 July 2010 
27 June 2005 
7 June 2010 (first 
round) 
23 September 
2010 (second 
round) 
Transfer of staff Very frequent 
Newcomers not 
fitting the job 
Frequent 
Newcomers not 
fitting the job 
Moderately 
frequent 
Newcomers not 
fitting the job 
Very frequent 
Newcomers not 
fitting the job 
Finance from donor 
agencies 
Sufficient; donor 
could finance long 
policy process. 
More than sufficient 
The policy process 
involved intensive and 
extensive discussions 
at the village and 
kabupaten levels, 
lobby, public 
consultation, and 
campaign. 
Insufficient, no 
more effort after 
rejection 
Insufficient, no 
more effort after 
rejection 
Other incentives or 
disincentives 
The local 
parliament has 
the incentive to 
win the Jawa Post 
Autonomy Award. 
--- --- --- 
 
The importance of external factors is very clear in the case of Blitar and Lombok Tengah, 
where political events give advantage to the political process and enhance the approval of perda 
(Table 11).  
 
Table 11. Political Events in Kabupaten Blitar and Kabupaten Lombok Barat 
Political Event 
Timing 
Kabupaten Blitar Kabupaten Lombok Barat 
Prolegda 2008 2007 
Perda legislation 18 December 2008 14 March 2008 
Legislative election 6 March 2009 6 March 2009 
JPIP Award  August 2009 - 
 
In Blitar, the prolegda took place in 2008. The next “supposed” legislation date of the perda was 
18 December 2008, which was coincidental with the International Migrant Day. The 
incumbent members of parliament had enough to prove their support to the migrant workers 
prior to the legislative election, which was on 6 March 2009. In Lombok Barat, the perda 
entered into the prolegda in 2007 and was officially legislated on 14 March 2008, prior to the 
legislative election on 6 March 2009. In migrant-source kabupaten, the incumbents could use 
policies in favor of migrant workers to gain vote from them. Therefore, in these two 
kabupaten, the timing of the policy process gave incentive to the legislative members to commit 
themselves to the legislation of the perda.  
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Unfortunately, the favorable election timing in Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah did not concur 
with the policy process. The legislative members in Blitar were also encouraged by the 
Autonomy Award of the Jawa Post Institute. The award was given to the local parliament after 
completing the policy process of protection perda, which was the legislative’s initiative. 
 
The election time might be a good incentive to the legislation. However, to NGOs in Lombok 
Barat, the election time was seen as a barrier to implementation. The perda of this kabupaten 
had been legislated on 14 March 2008, but due to the election events, progress of its 
implementation was very slow.50 Following the election, the administration was changed and, 
therefore, transfers of staff took place. The new staff members chosen were not necessarily 
those who understood the issues in their new jobs. Again, this had impeded the 
implementation. 
 
The transfers of government staff were unanimously considered to weaken public service 
delivery (see Box 4). This was the concern of not only NGOs but also the government staff 
themselves. The transfers not only happen too often but also do not consider the 
qualifications of the new staff member. Eventually, this reshaping of administration only 
weakens the public services, making people suffer, instead of advancing them. Indeed, no one 
benefits from these unnecessary transfers of staff, except the rent seekers. 
 
Last but certainly not least, the financial support from donor agencies is apparently a very 
important element in the policy process. The local innovative idea to protect migrant workers 
at the migrant-sending kabupaten requires funding. Without sufficient funding, local NGOs 
alone would not succeed. In the case of Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah, the duration of 
funding was very limited. Once the raperda was rejected to enter the proledga, the funding 
stopped. On the contrary, in Blitar, donors were able to extend their support so that the 
raperda could finally obtain approval from the legislative body. 
                                                      
50Interview with Rita (21 October 2010). 
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Box 4 
Transfers of Staff at the Local Level: A Damaging Aspect of Decentralization 
 
Transfers of staff have become a regular phenomenon across Indonesia ever since a direct pilkada 
(kabupaten/kota executive election) was introduced in 2004. Pilkada has changed the supposedly neutral 
bureaucracy of pilkada into a political one. As a vehicle for power and, hence, financial gain, pilkada involves 
numerous candidates and, of course, the incumbent. Prior to pilkada, the incumbent bupati and his/her 
success team normally scrutinize the loyalty of his/her staff. They then rotate the staff, giving the prosperous 
sectors or occupations to the ones they trust most. This game becomes even more complicated if the deputy 
bupati also registers himself/herself to be a candidate. This is because the direct pilkada causes rivalry 
between the bupati/walikota (kota head) and his/her deputy a year or two prior to the election time. 
 
Why, then, should the bureaucracy, in this case the head of the local Labor and Transmigration Agency, take 
the side of any of the pilkada candidates? The answer is simple: You are damned if you take sides and 
damned all the same if you do not. Transfers of staff will take place no matter what. In this case, the optimal 
solution is eyeing the most possible candidate and demonstrating one’s loyalty to him/her. It can be said that, 
in practice, this is, therefore, nothing less than gambling. 
 
Our informants have observed that lately there has been a greater as well as worrying tendency of transfers of 
staff to happen. In the first direct pilkada, only echelon-I officials, which were heads of local labor and 
transmigration agencies, were transferred. Now, it has included echelon-II and even echelon-III officials. 
 
Unfortunately, the qualifications of the staff in these new positions are the last factor considered. One can find 
the kabupaten health agency to be occupied by a person with a literature background. Or, the agency in 
charge of gender issues is chaired by an official who used to deal with livestock. Even more unfortunately, the 
leaving staff normally carry with them all the official data for heaven-knows reasons. There is no turnover 
process and, therefore, their successors have to start from square one in building the new database. Imagine 
how this impacts public service delivery! 
 
Source: Interviews with staff members of Asosiasi Buruh Migran Bumi Gora of Lombok Tengah: Ana (female, 
about 40 years old, 29 October 2010) and Pipit (female, about 30 years old, 29 October 2010); a staff member 
of BPS of Kabupaten Lombok Tengah: Nono (male, about 40 years old, 29 October 2010); Yudha (29 October 
2010); and Bobby (28 October 2010). 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 
5.1 Conclusion 
 
Overseas employment has been in the grey area as to whether it should be centralized or 
decentralized. Two most important legal frameworks—Law No. 39/2004 and Government 
Regulation No. 38/2007—both characterize centralized governance, with placement, rather 
than protection, of migrant workers dominating the provisions. In terms of placement, Law 
No. 39/2004 assigns the BNP2TKI, a vertical body with many units of service centers and 
posts at the provincial and kabupaten/kota levels under its authority, to handle the G-to-G 
deployment (Articles 10 and 92 (2a)) and the PPTKIS to take care of the P-to-P deployment 
(Article 10). Government Regulation No. 38/2007 assigns the central government the tasks of 
giving numerous permits and licensing PPTKIS. In terms of protection, Law No. 39/2004 is 
in charge of the preplacement protection (Article 82). 
 
With this centralized management, the central government faces a lot of difficulties in dealing 
with 80% of the problems that occur in the migrant-sending kabupaten/kota and villages. This 
is true because Law No. 39/2004 is considered to be particularly weak in supervision. First, 
supervisory roles are assigned to governments at all levels, including the local government 
(Article 92 (1)) and the BNP2TKI (Article 95). On the other hand, the delineation of authority 
between governments at all levels and the BNP2TKI is far from clear. Moreover, this triggers 
the question whether supervisory fund is also shared with kabupaten/kota where the BNP2TKI 
has no representatives, except the small service posts in 14 kabupaten/kota. Second, the 
provisions on supervision (Article 92 (3)) and supervisory mechanisms (Article 93) are yet to 
be completed. Law No. 39/2004 promises to issue the implementing legislation, but so far it 
fails to do so. Third, supervision becomes more difficult to carry out at the kabupaten/kota 
level, as the branch office could not be held responsible for any activities happening in the 
field (Article 23).  
 
To add to these complications, Government Regulation No. 38/2007 gives even more 
intensive responsibilities, some of which are the tasks previously assigned by Law No. 
39/2004 to the PPTKIS, to the local government, while some others are duties to support the 
central government’s responsibilities which are not mentioned in Law No. 39/2004. This 
poses the following two questions: To what extent is the local government aware of and 
committed to performing these extended tasks? And is it capable of performing them? 
 
To answer these questions, one should refer to the performance of kabupaten/kota in the 
decentralization era. Not surprisingly, some kabupaten/kota believe that autonomy has opened 
new opportunities to take initiatives and improve public services. However, many also see 
autonomy as a vehicle to collect local revenues by means of issuing perda on local taxes and 
retribusi. Indeed, employment is one of the areas where kabupaten/kota can extract levies. Many 
of the perda related to overseas employment in fact violate Law No. 28/2009 on Local Taxes 
and Retribusi. They also violate Law No. 13/2003 on Labor, and Presidential Decree No. 
36/2002 on the Ratification of ILO Convention No. 88 on the Organization of Employment 
Service. Yet, for many kabupaten/kota, the freedom to issue perda has been wrongly understood 
as a symbol of independence from the central government. 
 
The research team collected 127 perda related to overseas employment from 115 
kabupaten/kota. In order to map them according to the kabupaten’s/kota’s number of migrant 
workers, the team constructed the following typology: type-1 perda, that is, perda on general 
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employment which is extractive; type-2 perda, that is, perda on general kabupaten/kota revenue 
which is extractive; type-3 perda, that is, perda on placement procedure which is 
nonextractive; and type-4 perda, that is, perda on protection which is nonextractive. The team 
found that out of the 127 perda, 81% fall in type-1 perda, 14.2% type-2 perda, and 2.4% type-3 
and type-4 perda. In 82 migrant-source kabupaten/kota, only 3 kabupaten (3.7%) have 
protection perda (type-4 perda). 
 
The team also performed a mapping analysis where it found that migrant-source 
kabupaten/kota issue both a higher number and variety of perda related to overseas 
employment. The team found that some kabupaten/kota with very low or even no migrant 
workers passed type-1 and type-2 perda. These are transit kabupaten/kota that border the 
neighboring receiving countries, such as Malaysia, Brunei, and Singapore. Many prospective 
migrant workers and the PPTKIS require administrative services from the government of 
these kabupaten/kota. At the same time, it is not surprising if irregular migration activities also 
take place in these kabupaten/kota. Interestingly, this mapping exercise found that our typology 
is not necessarily mutually exclusive. Kabupaten/kota that passed protection perda, such as 
Sumbawa and Lombok Barat, passed extractive perda as well. This implies that these kabupaten 
might have had good intention to protect their migrant workers but, at the same time, charged 
the workers either directly or indirectly, which is against the law. The only mutually exclusive 
case was Blitar, which only passed protection perda and none of the extractive types. 
 
From the mapping analysis, the team also learned that the majority of migrant-source 
kabupaten/kota are not ready to commit themselves to protecting their migrant workers. 
However, some kabupaten/kota are. The team selected four kabupaten—Blitar, Ponorogo, 
Lombok Barat, and Lombok Tengah—for the team’s benchmarking study. All of them 
had been given technical assistance through NGOs to formulate protection perda. Only 
Blitar and Lombok Barat managed to pass the perda. Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah were 
not ready to do so. 
 
The question is what makes some kabupaten/kota able to pass the protection perda. In order to 
understand this phenomenon, the team looked at the internal factors, namely the stakeholders 
and the relationships among them, and the external factors which are out of the control of the 
stakeholders. 
 
The field research showed that each case is unique. That is why the outcome cannot be 
explained in a standard model that applies for each observed kabupaten. The duration of the 
policy process, for example, was so short for Ponorogo that it appeared to have been 
insufficient to pass the perda and was so long for Blitar that it concurred with transfers of staff 
that took place several times, even if the perda was finally issued. However, the optimal 
duration for Lombok Barat, which was two years, turned out to be not optimal for Lombok 
Tengah. 
 
The substance of the perda was one of the reasons why the Government of Kabupaten Lombok 
Tengah decided not to proceed with the insertion of the raperda into the prolegda. Apparently, its 
similar substance to the substance of Law No. 39/2004 could not attract the attention of the 
stakeholders. However, the substance of the protection perda in Blitar was innovative and became 
the reason why the local government and the PPTKIS were resistant to it. 
 
The advocating NGOs in Blitar and Ponorogo took the position of policy contestation with 
Blitar being the success story, thanks to the willingness of the local parliament to tap this 
aspiration, and Ponorogo being a complete failure. In the case of Lombok Barat, the position 
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of policy engagement of the NGOs proved to be more effective, while the opposite took 
place in Lombok Tengah. 
 
The intervention of the PPTKIS was clear in East Java, resulting in the policy process being 
disturbed. In Ponorogo, the PPTKIS was known to have blocked the inclusion of the raperda 
into the prolegda through members of the parliament who own a PPTKIS or are closely related 
to the owner of the PPTKIS. In Blitar, the intervention of the PPTKIS could be 
counterbalanced by the high commitment of the members of the parliament and, therefore, 
the raperda could be approved. In NTB, the PPTKIS was not aware of the raperda. With this 
favorable context, the perda in Lombok Barat succeeded to be legislated, but not in Lombok 
Tengah. 
 
In some cases, the timing of election at the kabupaten/kota level turned to be advantageous to 
the approval of the perda. This was the case for Blitar and Lombok Barat, but not for 
Ponorogo and Lombok Tengah. However, the timing of election could also be detrimental to 
the implementation of perda. In Lombok Barat, the legislated perda had to wait until the 
election events were over before it could be implemented. 
 
Apart from the above-mentioned factors, we also found that the (i) trust and commitment of 
the local government and local parliament, (ii) strong capacity of NGOs, and (iii) strong 
support of the donor agencies are common factors that positively influence the success of 
perda legislation. The commitment of the local government, in particular, is essential during the 
implementation phase. Therefore, engaging them from the onset will enable an effective 
execution of the mandate of the perda. At the same time, transfers of government staff, which 
are taking place too often and without fit and proper consideration, are damaging the public 
service delivery, including the protection of migrant workers. Finally, the strong support of the 
donor agencies is equally essential since local NGOs alone would not be able to encourage the 
local government to protect the migrant workers. 
 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
 
With the above findings at hand, we can, therefore, propose the following recommendations. 
Law No. 39/2004 should be revised as soon as possible to ensure more effective roles of the 
local government in the protection of migrant workers. The revised law should clearly 
stipulate the local government’s roles in supervision (Article 92) and supervisory mechanism 
(Article 93). Furthermore, the authority of the local government in protecting migrant workers 
can only be enhanced if Article 23 of the law is annulled. With this, the local government can 
then impose sanctions on the branch office of the PPTKIS in breach of the law and 
regulation. 
 
The annulment of perda on retribusi that charge migrant workers should be carried out 
immediately. In addition, perda on retribusi that excessively charge the PPTKIS should also be 
reviewed, as the PPTKIS will eventually transfer the costs to the migrant workers. It is the 
responsibility of the local government to provide regular services to the workers free of charge 
as a reflection of its accountability to its citizens. 
 
On the grounds that the central government has been changing policies and regulations very 
frequently, the migrant-source kabupaten should regularly be updated with the most recent 
legal framework. One should not assume that the local government will automatically be 
aware of the policy changes at the national level without proper socialization. 
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The migrant-source kabupaten bear the enormous tasks stipulated by both Law No. 39/2004 
and Government Regulation No. 38/2007. For this reason, budget allocation to these 
kabupaten should be increased. At the same time, these areas—through their migrant 
workers—have long paid US$15/worker to the central government for the so-called 
assistance and protection program.  If the local government is to help improve the protection 
of migrant workers during the recruitment phase, it is more than justified if the central 
government adds its financial support to the local government. Also, it is only fair if the 
US$15/worker fund is channeled back to its origin, namely the migrant-source kabupaten, to 
develop a sustainable protection mechanism and help reduce 80% of all the upstream 
problems. This is particularly applicable in the case of a kabupaten with a protection perda. 
 
Lombok Barat, along with its protection commission which is considered as best practice, can 
serve as a good model. However, prior to its replication in other migrant-source kabupaten, the 
model needs to be tested first. The protection commission itself is an ad hoc body whose 
expertise in the long run has to be transferred to the labor and transmigration agency. In this 
regard, SMERU recommends a pilot project supporting the protection commission by means 
of the Specific Allocation Fund (DAK) and/or the Deconcentration Fund (Dana Dekon). To 
start with, Lombok Barat can be the pilot area. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Governmental Responsibilities Related to Overseas Employment 
 
Table A1. Intergovernmental Responsibilities in Overseas Employment Based on 
Government Regulation No. 38/2007 
Central Government Provincial Government Local Government 
1a. Assistance, control, and 
supervision of the placement 
of overseas employment  
1a. - 1a. Information dissemination, 
registration, and selection of 
prospective migrant workers at the 
kabupaten/kota level  
1b. Operator of the G-to-G 
placement of overseas 
employment  
1b. - 1b. Supervision of recruitment of 
prospective migrant workers at the 
kabupaten/kota level  
2. Formulating bilateral and 
multilateral agreements with 
destination countries  
2. Assisting the implementation 
of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements at the provincial 
level  
2. Assisting the implementation of 
bilateral and multilateral 
agreements at the kabupaten/kota 
level  
3. Issuing (i) SIPPTKIS or 
SIUP51 for PPTKIS, (ii) 
recruitment recommendation, 
(iii) SIP 
3. Issuing (i) permit to establish 
branch office at the provincial 
level, (ii) recommendation to 
renew the SIPPTKIS  
3. Issuing permit to establish 
branch office at the 
kabupaten/kota level  
4. Document verification, 
issuing KTKLN, issuing certain 
passport recommendations for 
crash programs 
4. Document verification at the 
provincial level  
4. Issuing passport 
recommendation based on the 
domicile of the workers  
5. Implementation of SISKO 
TKLN and supervision of 
protection fee compliance 
5. Information dissemination on 
SISKO TKLN and supervision of 
protection fee compliance at the 
provincial level 
5. Information dissemination on 
SISKO TKLN and supervision of 
protection fee compliance at the 
kabupaten/kota level 
6a. Setting up of the standard 
of work contract, assessment 
of work contracts, validation of 
work contracts 
6a. Socialization of the content 
of work and placement contracts 
at the provincial level  
6a. Socialization of the content of 
work and placement contracts at 
the kabupaten/kota level  
6b. - 6b. - 6b. Assessment and validation of 
placement contracts 
7. Implementation of PAP  7. Assistance of PAP 
implementation  
7. - 
8a. Implementation of 
protection program, support, 
and advocacy for the workers 
8a. Assistance, supervision, and 
protection of the workers at the 
provincial level  
8a. Assistance, supervision, and 
monitoring of placement and 
protection of the workers at the 
kabupaten/kota level  
8b. Setting up of the standard 
of shelters and BLK-LN. 
8b. Issuance of permit for shelter 
at the provincial level  
8b. Issuance of permit for shelter 
at the kabupaten/kota level  
8c. Setting up of the standard 
and appointment of institutions 
related to placement 
(insurance companies, banks, 
medical clinics) 
8c. - 8c. - 
9. Assistance in homecoming 
and deportation at the national 
level 
9. Assistance in homecoming at 
the arrival terminal at the 
provincial level 
9. Homecoming service for migrant 
workers from kabupaten/kota. 
                                                      
51Trading license. 
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Table A2. Comparison of the Local Government’s Responsibilities  
Roles and Responsibilities of the Local 
Government 
According to Gov. 
Regulation No. 
38/2007 
According to Law No. 
39/2004 
Recruitment 
 Information dissemination Local government PPTKIS (A. 22) 
 Registration Local government Local government (A. 36 & A. 37) & PPTKIS (A. 22) 
 Selection of prospective workers Local government PPTKIS (A. 22) 
 Supervision of recruitment Local government Local government (A. 92) 
Bilateral and multilateral agreements 
 Assistance in the implementation  Local government - 
PPTKIS permit  
 Permit to establish PPTKIS branch office at 
the kabupaten/kota level 
Local government Local government (A. 21 & 
A. 37) 
Document of the workers 
 Recommendation of passport application  Local government Local government (A. 51) 
SISKO TKLN 
 Dissemination of SISKO TKLN Local government - 
 Supervision of protection fee (US$15) 
compliance 
Local government - 
Work and placement contracts 
 Socialization of the content of work and 
placement contracts 
Local government - 
 Assessment and validation of placement 
contracts 
Local government -a 
Supervision and monitoring of workers 
 Assistance, supervision, monitoring of 
placement and protection of the workers at 
the kabupaten/kota level 
Local government Local government (A. 92) 
 Permit to establish shelters  Local government Local government (A. 70) 
Homecoming  
 Homecoming service Local government PPTKIS (A. 75) 
Note: A. = Article. 
aArticles 38 and 54 of the law only state that the local government should be informed and be sent with a copy of the 
placement contract. 
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APPENDIX 2 
 
Table A3. Typology of Perda Related to Overseas Employment 
TYPE-1 PERDA 
Quantile #Migrant Workers Kabupaten/Kota Province No./Year Title of Perda 
1 0 Kabupaten Berau East Kalimantan 18/2002 Employment Service Feea 
1 0 Kabupaten Murung 
Raya 
Central 
Kalimantan 
22/2003 Employment Service Feea 
1 1 Kota Samarinda East Kalimantan 10/2001 Employment Service Feea 
1 3 Kota Banjarbaru South 
Kalimantan 
10/2002 Employment Service Feea 
1 5 Kabupaten Bangka Bangka Belitung 8/2003 Employment Service Feea 
1 9 Kabupaten Pelalawan Riau Islands 12/2003 Workers’ Placement and 
Protection Feea 
1 10 Kota Bontang East Kalimantan 6/2002 Employment Service Feea 
1 10 Kota Bontang East Kalimantan 7/2002 Employment Permit Fee 
1 13 Kota Prabumulih South Sumatra 4/2003 Employment Service Feea 
1 14 Kabupaten Kutai 
Kertanegara 
East Kalimantan 13/2001 Skills Development Fund for 
Migrant Workersa c 
1 14 Kabupaten Kutai 
Timur 
East Kalimantan 18/2002 Skills Development Fund for 
Migrant Workersa c 
1 14 Kabupaten Kutai 
Timur 
East Kalimantan 20/2002 Employment Service Fee 
1 14 Kabupaten Kota Baru South 
Kalimantan 
7/2003 Employment Service Feea 
1 22 Kabupaten Pasir East Kalimantan 7/2003 Employment Service Feea 
2 36 Kota Lubuk Linggau South Sumatra  11/2004 Employment Service Fee 
2 39 Kota Magelang Central Java 19/2001 Employment Permit Feea 
2 56 Kota Bogor West Java 7/2003 Employment Permit Fee 
2 59 Kota Bitung North Sulawesi 13/2001 Employment Feea 
2 63 Kota Banda Aceh Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam 
9/2003 Employment Service Fee 
2 70 Kabupaten Rokan 
Hulu 
Riau Islands 18/2003 Obligation to Report on 
Vacancies and Migrant Workers’ 
Placement 
2 72 
 
Kabupaten Bolaang 
Mangondow 
Gorontalo 21/2001 Employment Permit Fee 
2 72 Kabupaten Bolaang 
Mangondow  
Gorontalo 22/2002 Employment Service Fee 
2 80 Kota Banjarmasin South 
Kalimantan 
10/2003 Employment Service Fee 
2 103 Kabupaten Toba 
Samosir 
North Sumatra 5/2003 Employment Supervision and 
Protection Fee 
2 112 Kabupaten Malinau East Kalimantan 16/2002 Employment Service Fee 
2 113 Kota Dumai Riau Islands 10/2004 Employment 
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Quantile #Migrant Workers Kabupaten/Kota Province No./Year Title of Perda 
2 114 Kabupaten Musi 
Banyuasin 
South Sumatra  19/2002 Employment Service Feea 
2 124 Kota Bengkulu Bengkulu 5/2003  Employment Permit Fee 
2 124 Kota Bengkulu Bengkulu 6/2003 Employment Service Fee 
2 126 Kota Tangerang  Banten 13/2002 Employment Service Fee 
2 145 Kota Manado North Sulawesi 6/2002 Employment Placement and 
Protection Feea 
2 149 Kabupaten Tapanuli 
Tengah 
North Sumatra 46/2001 Employment Supervision and 
Protection Fee 
2 168 Kabupaten Luwu 
Timur 
South Sulawesi 16/2006 Employment Permit and Service 
Fee 
2 171 Kabupaten Ogan 
Komering Ulu 
South Sumatra  11/2005 Obligation to Report on Migrant 
Workers’ Placement  
2 173 Kabupaten Batang 
Hari 
Jambi 40/2001 Employment Permit Fee 
2 174 Kabupaten Bungo Jambi 2/2002 Local Revenue from Employment 
3 232 Kota Rejang Lebong Bengkulu 10/2002 Job Seekers’ Registration Fee 
and Employers’ Fee 
3 258 Kabupaten Muara 
Enim 
South Sumatra  24/2001 Employment Permit 
3 282 Kota Bandung West Java 19/2002 Employment Service Feea b  
3 286 Kota Makassar South Sulawesi 9/2004 Rules on Employment Service 
Feea 
3 316 Kabupaten Kuantan 
Singingi 
Riau Islands 7/2003 Workers’ Placement 
3 359 Kabupaten Nunukan East Kalimantan 43/2003 Employment Service Feea 
3 373 Kabupaten Hulu 
Sungai Selatan 
South 
Kalimantan 
14/2002 Employment Service Feea 
3 386 Kabupaten Mamuju West Sulawesi  9/2002 Employment Permit Feea 
3 431 Kota Cilegon Banten 12/2004 Employment Service Fee 
3 501 Kabupaten Dairi North Sumatra  5/2002 Employment 
3 504 Kota Surabaya East Java 1/2003 Employment Service Feea 
3 536 Kota Madiun East Java 8/2004 Employment Service Feea 
3 595 Kota Kupang East Nusa 
Tenggara 
14/2007 Employment 
3 634 Kabupaten Sidoarjo East Java 9/2008 Employment Serviceb 
3 687 Kabupaten Mojokerto East Java 4/2009 Employment Fee 
3 697 Kota Binjai North Sumatra 5/2003 Employment Supervision and 
Protection Fee 
3 738 Kabupaten Bengkulu 
Utara 
Bengkulu 12/2003 Employment Service Feea 
3 755 Kabupaten Pemalang East Java 5/2008 Employment Service Fee 
3 802 Kota Bandar 
Lampung 
Lampung 10/2003 Employment Feea 
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Quantile #Migrant Workers Kabupaten/Kota Province No./Year Title of Perda 
4 945 Kota Mataram West Nusa 
Tenggara 
7/2002 Employment Service Feea 
4 1,013 Kabupaten Luwu 
Utara 
South Sulawesi  34/2001 Employment Permit 
4 1,021 Kabupaten Sukoharjo Central Java 30/2001 Employment Permit Fee 
4 1,021 Kabupaten Sukoharjo Central Java 31/2001 Employment Service Fee 
4 1,052 Kabupaten Kampar Riau Islands 20/2003 Employment Service Fee 
4 1,110 Kota Palembang South Sumatra 22/2001 Employment Support Fee 
4 1,139 Kabupaten Donggala Central 
Sulawesi  
11/2002 PPTKIS License 
4 1,139 Kabupaten Donggala Central 
Sulawesi  
12/2002 Employment Recruitment Fee 
4 1,230 Kabupaten Maros South Sulawesi 18/2002 Employment Rules and Feea 
4 1,304 Kabupaten Pasaman West Sumatra 16/2003 Employment Service Fee 
4 1,310 Kabupaten 
Jeneponto 
South Sulawesi 5/2002 Employment Service Fee 
4 1,357 Kabupaten Bantul The Special 
Region of 
Yogyakarta 
(DIY) 
1/2005 Employment Placement  
4 1,359 Kabupaten 
Purbalingga 
Central Java 6/2001 Employment Permit and Service 
Fee 
4 1,421 Kabupaten Bekasi West Java 5/2001 Employment Service Feea 
4 1,583 Kota Medan North Sumatra 7/2003 Employment Service Fee 
4 1,637 Kabupaten Bogor West Java 4/2009 Employment License 
4 1,719 Kota Malang East Java 13/2007 Rules on Employment Service 
Fee 
4 1,954 Kabupaten Aceh 
Timur 
Nanggroe Aceh 
Darussalam 
9/2003 Employment Service and Permit 
Fee 
4 2,227 Kabupaten Gowa South Sulawesi 5/2002 Employment Service Fee 
4 2,263 Kabupaten Sikka East Nusa 
Tenggara 
24/2001 Employment Placement Feea 
4 2,487 Kabupaten 
Sumedang 
West Java 6/2002 Employment Feea 
4 2,802 Kabupaten Dompu West Nusa 
Tenggara 
16/2001 Employment Service Fee 
4 2,929 Kabupaten 
Tasikmalaya 
West Java 2/2006 Employment Service Fee 
4 3,158 Kabupaten Tana 
Toraja 
South Sulawesi 8/2003 Employment Permit Fee 
4 3,534 Kabupaten 
Banjarnegara 
Central Java 3/2003 Migrant Workers’ Placement 
5 4,202 Kabupaten Magelang Central Java 15/2005 Employment Permit Fee 
5 4,843 Kabupaten Sragen Central Java 10/2004 Employment Permit Fee 
5 5,388 Kabupaten Pinrang South Sulawesi 7/2003 Employment Service Fee 
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Quantile #Migrant Workers Kabupaten/Kota Province No./Year Title of Perda 
5 5,853 Kabupaten Bima West Nusa 
Tenggara 
158/2006 Employment Service 
5 6,834 Kabupaten 
Tangerang 
West Java 21/2002 Employment Service Fee 
5 7,162 Kabupaten Kebumen Central Java 52/2004 Employment Feea 
5 8,304 Kabupaten Sumbawa West Nusa 
Tenggara 
12/2003 Employment Service Fee 
5 8,879 Kabupaten Lumajang East Java 28/2004 Employment License 
5 10,124 Kabupaten Kerinci Jambi 11/2002 Employment Feea 
5 10,891 Kabupaten 
Purwakarta 
West Java 18/2002 Employment Service Fee 
5 11,489 Kabupaten Bone South Sulawesi 10/2002 Employment Permit Fee 
5 13,141 Kabupaten Kediri East Java 8/2003 Employment Service Feea 
5 14,469 Kabupaten Jember East Java 12/2003 Employment Feea 
5 17,666 Kabupaten Serang Banten 7/2009 Employment 
5 17,967 Kabupaten Bandung West Java 26/2001 Employment Permit and Service 
Fee 
5 19,035 Kabupaten Subang West Java 7/2002 Employment Feeb 
5 25,122 Kabupaten Gresik East Java 14/2005 Employment Permit and Service 
Fee 
5 26,896 Kabupaten Ponorogo East Java 6/2004 Employment Service Feeb 
5 29,201 Kabupaten Sukabumi West Java 13/2005 Mobilization of Migrant Workers  
5 32,380 Kabupaten Malang East Java 7/2005 Employment Serviceb 
5 36,192 Kabupaten Karawang West Java 22/2001 Employment Service Feea 
5 38,715 Kabupaten 
Tulungagung 
East Java 12/2002 Employment License 
5 57,067 Kabupaten 
Indramayu 
West Java 6/2003 Employment Feea b 
 
TYPE-2 PERDA 
Quantile #Migrant Workers Kabupaten/Kota Province No./Year Title of Perda 
1 3 Kabupaten Barito 
Utara 
Central 
Kalimantan 
6/2005 Legalization feeb 
1 13 Kabupaten 
Kotawaringin Timur 
Central 
Kalimantan 
2/2002 Legalization feeb 
2 157 Kabupaten Musi 
Rawas 
South Sumatra  11/2002 Legalization feeb 
3 297 Kota Tasikmalaya West Java 23/2003 Legalization feeb 
4 935 Kabupaten Sidenreng 
Rappang 
South Sulawesi 31/2001 Third Party Contributionb 
4 1,405 Kabupaten Soppeng South Sulawesi 11/2001 Third Party Contributionb 
4 2,802 Kabupaten Dompu West Nusa 
Tenggara 
20/2001 Legalization Feeb 
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Quantile #Migrant Workers Kabupaten/Kota Province No./Year Title of Perda 
5 4,581 Kabupaten Jepara Central Java 17/2001 Administration Feesb 
5 5,853 Kabupaten Bima West Nusa 
Tenggara 
25/2001 Legalization Fee  
5 5,998 Kabupaten Garut West Java  34/2001 Third Party Contributionb 
5 6,296 Kabupaten Lembata East Nusa 
Tenggara 
6/2005 Administration Feesb 
5 6,534 Kabupaten Magetan Central Java 25/2000 Administration Feesb 
5 9,754 Kabupaten 
Banyuwangi 
East Java 28/2002 Third Party Contributionb 
5 18,237 Kabupaten Lombok 
Barat 
West Nusa 
Tenggara 
13/2002 Other Legitimate Local Revenuesb 
5 23,750 Kabupaten Flores 
Timur 
East Nusa 
Tenggara 
4/2005 Administration Fees 
5 37,696 Kabupaten Lombok 
Tengah 
West Nusa 
Tenggara 
31/1995 Third Party Contribution 
5 38,126 Kabupaten Cirebon West Java 7/1987 Third Party Contributionb 
5 49,126 Kabupaten Cianjur West Java 8/2001 Legalization Feeb 
 
TYPE-3 PERDA 
Quantil
e 
#Migrant 
Workers Kabupaten/Kota Province No./Year Title of Perda 
5 14,469 
 
Kabupaten Jember East Java 5/2008 Service for, and Placement and 
Protection of Indonesian Migrant 
Workersb 
5 41,209 Kabupaten Lombok 
Timur 
East Nusa 
Tenggara 
12/2006 Protection of Indonesian Migrant 
Workersb 
5 49,126 Kabupaten Cianjur West Java 15/2002 Protection of Indonesian Migrant 
Workersb  
 
TYPE-4 PERDA 
Quantil
e 
#Migrant 
Workers Kabupaten/Kota Province No./Year Title of Perda 
5 8,304 
 
Kabupaten Sumbawa West Nusa 
Tenggara  
21/2007 Protection and Empowerment of 
Migrant Workersb 
5 18,237 Kabupaten Lombok 
Barat 
West Nusa 
Tenggara 
5/2008 Protection of Indonesian Migrant 
Workersb 
5 28,430 
 
Kabupaten Blitar East Java 16/2008 Protection of Indonesian Migrant 
Workers in Foreign Countriesb 
aThe Ministry of Home Affairs has cancelled this perda. 
bCopy of perda is available. 
cCategorized as type 1 because it was cancelled by the Ministry of Home Affairs. One of the reasons of the cancellation was 
that the perda imposed a fee that was burdensome for the investment climate. 
dThe number of migrant workers based on the 2005 Podes. 
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APPENDIX 3 
 
Distributions Based on Year and Province 
 
 
Figure A1. Distribution of perda based on their issuing year 
Note: Total number of perda = 127. 
 
 
Figure A2. Distribution of the corresponding provinces of the kabupaten 
issuing the perda 
Note: Total number of kabupaten = 115. 
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